A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY IN ALGERIA (1830-1871) AND THE BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN EGYPT (1882-1900)

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To the Memory of my Parents
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This dissertation tries to examine the policies of two colonial empires: The French colonial empire in Algeria (1830) and the British colonial one in Egypt (1882). It mainly attempts to analyze the similarities and the differences in terms of the colonial policies implemented. France’s falling short of making Algeria one of its integral parts and Britain’s failure in remaining permanently in Egypt will be focused. This dissertation will also attempt to show the peculiarities that existed in the implementation of their policies. Both Regencies (Algeria and Egypt) were officially Ottoman Regencies which remained semi-officially “free states”. There was a difference in the way power was held in Algeria and Egypt. For the former, the Dey (a Turk) ruled through a so-called “elective Monarchy” after having been elected by a military élite: “the Odjak”. For the latter, the rule was in the hands of a “Dynasty” of hereditary “Khedives” who ruled through a Ministry consisting of Egyptians. Unlike Britain which had a precedent in the systematic colonization of India, after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-1858, Algeria was France’s first and biggest achievement, though it did not arouse any enthusiasm on the French part, and remained till the eighties the testing ground of de French policies.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the Southern borders of the Mediterranean and Europe has, throughout the ages alternated between periods of war
and domination and periods of peace and cooperation. The fact that Northern Africa (East and West) has very often been subdued by ancient and modern European powers (Greece, France, Britain, etc.) is mainly due to the absence in North East Africa and the Maghrib (North West Africa) of solid, coherent and united entities. The latter, had been “masters of their own destinies” incapable of opposing successfully other countries hegemonic designs.

Another reason for North East and West Africa weakness lay in the fact that the struggle for power was constant. Algeria’s situation under the control of little kingdoms, i.e. Tlemcen, Tihert (Tiaret nowadays) and Egypt’s under the Mamelucks (Slaves of non-Arab and non-Muslim origin) in power in 1250, who were enrolled to reinforce Arab troops throughout the world, were degrading.

In the 16th century, the Algerians were suffering from internal disorders and external threats, therefore, they were obliged to call the Ottomans to their rescue. Surprisingly, it was the intervention of the Barbarossa brothers that dominated

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Algeria’s history for a long time. These last turned out to be the precursors of Turkish hegemony over Algiers’ Regency. For more than three centuries, the Barbary (North Africa) privateers constituted a serious threat to Mediterranean trade and indeed dominated it. It is only in 1830, that France, exasperated by those privateers’ continual attacks against her ships, decided to wage an armed expedition against Algiers’ Regency.

The different and often conflicting policies pursued by the French in Algeria clearly showed that, if the expedition was carefully prepared, Algeria’s subsequent destiny was not. Because of this lack of foresight, the French were obliged to go forward warily in the application of their regulations (i.e. military and civilian, assimilation, cantonment, etc.) which aroused the Algerians and the French settlers alike (although for different reasons). The natives complained about the regulations, which were too harsh for them. Conversely, the colonists argued that the regulations applied were not harsh enough.

On the other hand, once the Ottomans overthrew the Mamlucks in the beginning of the 16th century (like Algeria a bit later) Egypt became a province governed from Istanbul. Mohamed Ali, who was Pasha from 1805 to 1849 created a dynasty and an empire which nonetheless remained under Ottoman suzerainty. However, it is his and his successors ‘accumulation of wealth together with their expanding policies that left

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Egypt in a deep state of indebtedness and provided Britain with a reason for intervening and occupying the country at a time of great upheaval under Arabi. What followed was a logical consequence of the imposition of rules by foreigners in countries with totally different religious, economic and social traditions.

Moreover, the pressures exercised by the colonizers upon the natives of the countries that came to control militarily and administratively therefore gave birth to a feeling of rejection while at the same time a need for national identity was taking shape. Arabi’s leitmotif “Egypt for the Egyptians” and Abd-El-Kader’s insistence that” Algeria was a muslim state” led the natives to struggle against the colonial empire.

France’s vacillation in Algeria resulted inevitably in inequities at the natives’ expense, who, in turn, responded with a determination to put an end to foreign control thus leading to an explosive situation where resistance movements struggled against colonialism.

This research work is divided into three chapters. The first chapter examines the situation in Algeria before and after 1830. The second chapter provides a historical account of the situation in Egypt before and after 1832. The third chapter, which is the core of the present study, attempts to analyze the French colonial empire in Algeria and the British colonial empire in Egypt. It mainly tries to focus on the similarities and
the differences in terms of the implementation of the colonial policies of the French and the British colonial empires.

In writing this dissertation about the policies pursued by the French in Algeria and the British in Egypt, my aim was not to give an exhaustive account of all the similarities and differences that existed in the implementation of France’s and Britain’s policies. To do so would have required a much longer space. What I attempted to do was to highlight the most significant points of similarities and differences.
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1.1 Introduction.

The relationship between France and Algiers’ Regency which was more or less good (there were commercial agreements between both countries as early as the sixteenth century), started to deteriorate when France occupied Egypt in 1798, becoming thus the muslims’ enemy in general and the Turks’ in particular. From that moment onwards, the Algerian fleet (under Ottoman rule) received the order to attack every French ship crossing the Mediterranean.

1.2 The Situation in Algeria before 1830

During Napoleon’s reign, the non-stop wars that occurred between France and Algiers’ than a desire to be more prosperous and made Louis XIV’s ambassador to the ‘Sublime Porte’ state that ‘Algiers starves when it is in peace’. As a result of this hostility between the two countries, France’s trading establishments (which were installed in the 16th century) were destroyed. There was, however, a ‘détente’ between them in 1800 which culminated in a treaty signed between the Regency and France, as well as a commercial agreement.

The situation changed from 1805 onwards when France, which had for a long time been considered as ‘master of the seas’ in the Mediterranean,

lost the battle of Trafalgar against England, giving the latter the position France enjoyed for

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several centuries. Being essentially a maritime nation, against her boats decided to give a lesson to the Algerian fleet after 1815. the against a weakened France.

In 1808, Napoleon, anxious about the whole situation, thought of a landing in the Regency, but preoccupied by very serious problems in France, had to give up the idea. Surprisingly, it was not France (which suffered the most from the Algerian attacks) which decided to put an end to piracy, but rather America, which exceeded by the attacks. This American action against the regency destroyed practically the entire fleet, hence destroying the French pretext that the aim of the 1830’s expedition was the destruction of the Algerian navy. To know more about the reasons (direct or indirect) for the 1830 French expedition in Algiers, one has to seek the deep roots which lay in France’s political situation at that time.

The French revolution which took place in 1789 had to face the most serious economic problems France ever faced despite the fact that it had significant political success. The particularly bad previous winters ruined
the entire agriculture. The wheat (the most important crop in France) supply, which was insufficient, made Dey Hussein (who supported the French Revolution against traditional monarchies) agree to make a loan to the French so that they could buy the necessary wheat which incidentally happened to be exported by Algeria.

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Whole transaction was under the financial supervision of two Jews, Bacri and Bushnak, whose devilish plot against the Dey was one (if not the most) important cause of the French expedition in Algeria. Thanks to their affair (which lasted no less than thirty years) thy could accumulate huge amounts of money as well as acquire great influence upon officials3from both the Algerian and French sides (i.e. the French consul, Deval). Before 1830, and from the legal point of view, Algeria’s status was a rather ambiguous one. As A. Hamdani stated in his “la vérité sur l’expédition d’Alger”,

Algiers was “neither a Turkish colony nor a province ruled by a regent named by the Sultan, neither an independent state following Turkish rules”, but rather a mixture of all these characteristics which
were the result of “three hundred years of Turkish presence in Algeria rather than domination”.

As a Turkish province, it was ruled by a Pasha (a sort of ruler whose status was inferior to the Dey’s), who, although chosen by a Sultan, had however to pay a tribute to him. The situation changed when Deys (rulers) replaced Pashas. As a consequence of that change, (which was not just in title), Deys were given more power, thus making Algiers’ Regency a military state with an Odjak (a militia of Janissaries) whose influence was very strong on the policy-makers.

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It was a military class which despite the restricted number of its members (never more than 15,000 thousand soldiers) benefited not only from power but from the considerable profits made out of piracy also, especially in the seventeenth century.

From the administrative point of view, the natives were totally excluded from the Odjak. The Turks exercised the highest functions. As for the Dey, he ruled Dar-Es-Sultan (Algiers’ suburbs and the Mitidja’s Plain). Both these areas were administered through Arabs’ Agha (administrative

chief) as well as four Turkish Caids (local chiefs). The rest of the Regency was divided into three other areas called “Beyliks” (administrative divisions). The Tittery was in the centre, Oran was in the West, and Constantine was in the East.

In this scramble for power, it was he (Arabs’ Agha) who offered the largest amount of money (or bribery) who would be offered the position of Bey by the Dey. When defining Algeria’s state structures, Julien, Ch. A is very explicit about Algeria’s status when he states: “In 1830, Algeria remained (from the legal point of view) a province of the Ottoman Empire. In fact it was an exploitation colony, ruled by a minority of Turks with the co-operation of indigenous notables.”

As far as the social hierarchy was concerned, the Regency was divided as follows: on top were the occupying power’s (i.e. Turkey) representatives who were all Turkish Janissaries belonging to the Odjak or Moorish on their mother’s. Their situation was. Below that category were the Kouloughlis who were Turkish on their father’s side an Arab only ambiguous but also uneasy not because of their being part of two tally different classes.
Then came the moors (those Muslims who were forced to leave Spain in 1492) descendants who became mostly traders and bourgeois, then those who were relegated to the bottom of the social scale despite their being the original citizens of the country, i.e. the Algerians themselves who quite understandably were hostile to the Turks not just for that reason but also for the Odjak’s ruthlessness towards them. This social tableau would probably be incomplete if the Jewish community (and through it Bacri and Bushnak) having played a key role in the French intervention in Algiers’ Regency, was not mentioned.

The Edict of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castille gave the Jews (then in Spain) two alternatives: conversion or exile. These Jews came mainly from Italy (in 1342), Holland (1350), France (1403), and England (1422). Khaireddine who created Algiers’ Regency in the early sixteenth century allowed Jews who were fleeing from the Spanish inquisition to settle in Algeria. Their resources came mainly from trade (especially the sale of the Corsairs’ captures). Needless to say their influence as well as their fortune increased to the point that they became the

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government’s best information agents, the masters of foreign trade and the Regency, as well as the semi-official diplomats to the European Chancelleries.  

As for the ‘Franc-Jews’ Bacri and Bushnak, they even benefited from the French Consul’s protection because he feared their influence. Thanks to all these factors, the Jewish duet controlled two-thirds of all trade, becoming thus a real economic power. As for the government, its main duty was to raise taxes and maintain public order. In all “dominated” countries (although the characteristics of Turkish “Colonialism” were quite different from the French), it was mainly the peasants who suffered most (although as it will be shown later, the Egyptian peasants’ situation was far worse than the Algerians’ owing to the profound financial crisis Egypt was involved in), since they had to support excessive expenses.

Where the situation also differs from the French is that these expenses were far from being profitable to the state in the sense that following a certain hierarchy, each official (or civil servant) would deduct a certain amount of money from these taxes for the maintenance of his own services.

In order to maintain peace and order, the Turkish authorities tried by all sorts of means to prevent the Algerians from unifying, thus stopping any

attempt towards nationalism or revolt against their rule. However, the Turks as opposed

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to the French, never made of Algeria a “settlers’ colony” since the number of Turks brought into Algeria was not very important, nor did they take (as they did in Egypt) the natives’ land.

This, however, did not prevent the ‘indigenous’ from revolting of their abuses, brutality, and unfair rules. The revolt with which the Turkish rulers were constantly confronted, only showed the Algerians’ hostility to any foreign rule, especially when this was characterized by abuse. But what essentially made the natives weak, prevented them from grouping into one united entity (instead of a group of disorganized and separate tribes) and allowed so many more powerful and united nations to colonize Algeria for 2822 years (the Carthaginians for 714 years, the Romans for 284 years, the Vandals for 100 years, the Turks for 315 years and finally the French for 132 years) was that at any moment their (natives’) autonomous sentiment never took a national nature. On the economic score, and, again, far from being a united entity, the country was fragmented because of the internecine wars between the different tribes and it was mainly the seriousness of this situation (which will be explained
later) which obliged Hussein (in power in 1818) to ask insistently, for the repayment of the debts France owned him.

As for the affair itself, i.e., the Bacri-Bhusnak affair, the appointment of Pierre Deval as the French Consul in the Regency in 1815 in order to solve France’s credit toward Dey Hussein did not please the Dey who felt him to be a trafficker without scruples. Despite the Dey’s insistence to see Deval replaced by someone else, the consul was however maintained.

In the meantime, Bacri and Bushnak were trying to convince the Dey (to whom they owed a lot of money) to accept as a payment for their debts, the credit they themselves owed to France, assuring him that if he complained directly to the French government, his credit would be considered as a state credit and thus would be paid to him in a short time.

Talleyrand (then Foreign Office Minister), was making big efforts to find a solution to the problem which he regarded as France’s obligation towards the Regency. The Dey however received nothing in spite of his complaints and continued to be the victim of Bacri and Busnak who, thanks to an ingenious plan (having registered the members of their own
families as money, owning members) which permitted them to embezzle substantial amounts of money from France.

Despite the Liberals denunciation about the illegality of the affair, the situation was going to last until 1827 (date of the Regency’s blockade) and therefore have tragic consequences about its future.

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As for the present situation of the Regency, it was far from satisfactory. Hussein was experiencing serious troubles from piracy, which had since the sixteenth century been the Regency’s main source of wealth, but had become practically non-existent (especially after the destruction of the Regency’s fleet by the Americans).

As a solution to that grave economic situation, Hussein thought of increasing the taxes which however did nothing to balance the budget; and it is precisely this negative result which made Hussein seek a recuperation of his debt from France. When at last France decided to pay what was owned to her, Hussein received almost nothing owing to the fact that it was Bacri and Bushnak (via the so-called members of their respective families) who got all the money. Suspecting nothing
about this plot, Hussein thought that he was France’s dupe and wrote
several letters to the French government, which intercepted at different
levels, received no reply at all.

The famous “fan-blow (coup d’éventail) by the Dey to the French
Consul, Deval, on March 29th, 1827, was going to be the pretext for all
sorts of contradictory plans which all reflected the state of indecision the
French politicians were in. At first, (after Deval’s report about the incident
was conveyed to Paris), the Ministers’ Council (Conseil des Ministres)
decided on

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armed intervention to avenge the offence which was considered a national
one since it was directed towards someone who symbolized France.

The conditions required by the French government were that all the
notables should come on board the French ship and apologize to the
Consul while the French flag was fluttering on the fortress. Having been
assured by the British Consul that a French armed intervention against
the Regency would never be permitted by Britain, the Dey, who was
usually prudent, gave in to the Consul’s influence and sent a letter whose
“threatening” end did not coincide with the more careful tone used in the
beginning. This made the Dey state: “If you send an honest French investigator in the following twenty-four hours the situation can improve, otherwise, we will be in a state of hostilities”

As a retaliation, instructions for the blockade of Algiers and Oran were given by the French authorities. Hussein’s immediate reaction was to expel all the French established in the Regency and burn down all their establishments. Despite this hostility between both countries, it is worth noting that at any moment the eventuality of an expedition was contemplated especially when we consider France’s actual “state of weakness” owing to the fact that she had sent most of her ships to Greece (1828) where a war of independence against the Turks was taking place.

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A common action between the French, the Russians and the English against the Sultan was thought of, but it was found that the blockade solution was a better one. The opinion of the members of the French government was however divided. Some were in favour of an expedition (notably the War Minister) who thought the affair was more a matter of prestige than anything else and that the only possible way to put an end to the situation without “losing face” was to
prepare a landing (or wage an expedition).

The War Minister, who was a fervent loyalist and a defender of the throne, kept inciting Saint Louis’ son, Charles X, to organize another crusade to avenge both religion and humanity. The Minister even went further by assuring that the Regency’s inhabitants were persuaded that the French were not replacing a tyranny by another. No mention was made about putting an end to piracy or protecting the French trade.

Glory (the Kings’ as well as France’s) seemed sufficient for the justification of the conquest. It was therefore no wonder that the King showed his disappointment in his Ministers’ refusal to embark in such a costly expedition for his desire to impress Parliament and restore his ruined reputation (because of the serious economic troubles inside France).

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Another solution was thought of: that of bringing Egypt’s Pasha Mehemet Ali to do the job for the French, giving as an argument that a Muslim action would be more efficient than a Christian one; but behind his argument lay France’s fear of the other countries reaction as well as
the fear of finding herself isolated; but her proposition to Egypt was turned down by Mehemet Ali, who, advised by Wellington, refused to act on France’s behalf.

The November elections of 1827 proved to be a failure for those who were in favour of an intervention. A lot of Liberals were against the project. As a direct consequence, Villèle, who was premier, was compelled to resign. A combined action between France, Russia and England was even envisaged as the French were very anxious to treat Britain with extreme caution and yet, a military action was still not contemplated.

The question was again submitted to the 1828 Parliamentary session, but it was given little attention owing to the fact that Parliament members were still trying to find a solution to problems they considered more important, i.e. the Greek question and the measures for internal order. The Liberals, who at first were against the expedition, urged (perhaps following the device of “opposition for opposition’s sake”) the Government to organize an armed action. The 1829 Parliamentary session ended, however, without any solution to the problem.

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One of the French ships being attacked by the Algerians (without the Dey’s orders) could have led to an attack by France against the Regency (giving her thus a good reason to do so.) but no reprisals followed. Ann armistice was then proposed to the Dey as an Algerian plenipotentiary to Paris (while a whole squadron was sent to Algiers), but the proposal was followed by a refusal. If France’s intentions were really peaceful, why then send a whole squadron?

In France, the political scene was such that French officials (especially Polignac) were confronted with a dilemma for they were conscious that whatever their decision, it would be refused by public opinion (hostile to both Polignac and his government because of their policy which, according to them, lacked realism).

Had it not been for its lack of realism, would Polignac have envisaged a few years earlier (1825) the possibility of sharing the Turkish remains and Europe’s “shakeup” with Prussia’s and Russia’s help as a reaction against Britain’s naval supremacy? In 1825, Britain, who heard about France’s intervention to make Egypt participate in her retaliation against Algeria, sought official information but Polignac denied the facts.

In 1828, Wellington’s Tory Cabinet was against any attempt to mix the Algerians and Turkish question which would have a disastrous effect, that of breaking the Oriental equilibrium and leading to the dismemberment of the Turkish empire.
As for Sardinia, she proposed that Tripoli, Malta, Algeria and Tunis should be given to Egypt. As for Russia, she was very much for a direct intervention. Polignac, totally isolated from the political point of view) and very anxious to offer his King a military glory, submitted once again the project of intervention which was finally adopted by the government on July 31st 1830.

At last, France was resolute to act by herself and was no longer looking for a scapegoat to take an action against the Regency. To justify that intervention, all sorts of reasons (some of which were never thought of before), were invoked: to avenge an affront she considered as serious, to neutralize the opposition by giving the King a striking victory, to enhance the King’s and the nation’s prestige, to destroy slavery and piracy, to ensure safe navigation of the Mediterranean, to bring back that side of the sea to production, commerce and civilization, to ensure the free passage of all nations and to defend Christianity.

But, behind these avowed reasons lay the desperate need to salvage the French treasury (empty because of the catastrophic agricultural production), to divert public attention from the internal economic problems, and to obtain favorable elections. Even the “Marseillais and Lyonnais” who, like the Liberals, were at first against the intervention,
soon became aware of the financial advantages they could get from it (i.e. the revival of their commercial counters and a reduction in unemployment).

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The decision (about the intervention) created fiery reactions from other countries. Charles X who on February 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1830, spoke in the following terms in the opening of the Royal Session: “In the midst of the grave events which preoccupied Europe, I had to put aside my anger against a (Barbary) power but I cannot any longer let the insult done to my country, be unpunished. The striking reparation I want to obtain will with God’s help, profitable to Christianity”.

Both assemblies now gave him their support but the opposition continued to be resolutely against, arguing that such an expedition would be too costly and would create only problems. The Liberals newspaper accused the Government of not having France’s interests at heart. Behind those acknowledged reasons for the expedition lay an important one which was the neutralization of Britain which maintained a very powerful position thanks to her navy and bases (Gibraltar held since 1704 and Malta since 1800).
Britain was very displeased with the whole situation owing to the fact that she had always been interested in the Barbary states because of their being situated in a very favorable geographic and strategic position (just halfway between Gibraltar and Malta). On the hand, France was undertaking intense diplomatic activity to give the operation a European (rather than a French) outlook.

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Incapable of stopping the French action (because of the other countries’ indifference) Britain attempted then to get from the French Government a promise not to stay in the conquered territories. This opposition to the French decision did not, however, stop Britain from participating in the expedition by sending a ship commanded by Captain W. Marshall. As far as the other countries’ reactions were concerned, they were all rather in favor of the expedition. Russia, under Tsar Nicolas I, and Prussia, under Frederick William III, supported France.

The Nordic states did too. As for Piedmont, she would have welcomed Turkey’s dismemberment had she been assured of sharing its remains. Pope Pius VIII (who was several times given help by France
against the Regency) even permitted France the use of Toscano. Spain, however, having signed important commercial treaties with the Regency, was reserved. Within France itself, the opposition was growing more and more hostile and assured the Government that the whole country would be opposed to an unfair and untimely war which would be used as a pretext for the triumph of the reaction.

The French diplomatic action was not directed towards Europe only. It was also directed towards Tunisia to prevent her from siding with Algiers’ Regency, and ensure the French troops the supply of food they needed. Polignac’s aim was

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to persuade the Arabs that France had not come in order to crush them but rather free them from Turkey’s bondage which they had been enduring for three hundred years.

History showed us that they only replaced a more or less “mild” form of colonialism with a tougher a more complete one. Incidentally, the difficulties encountered by the French Government on the international front were nothing when compared to the hostility of the Parliament and the Press. The main argument was that the project was impracticable.
Realizing that it could do nothing to stop it, the opposition was determined to make it fail at all costs. As Lemenais (Catholic priest and writer) so rightly put it: “By organizing the expedition, they (the government) wanted to distract public opinion from attacks against the Ministry and an increase in, taxes.  

Being aware that Parliament would refuse to support the expedition as well as finance it, the government preferred to submit the project to a private Swiss bank (which refused to provide the necessary amount of money required by the expedition). They then proposed the project (i.e. the financing of the expedition) to an English bank by assuring its members of all the financial advantages they were going to obtain from it.

When the expedition took place (it started on 29th May and lasted from 14th June until 4 July), public opinion was still hostile and considered the victory as trifling. The “Marseillais and Lyonnais” very soon became

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4 On a voulu distraire les esprits sur l’expédition d’Alger. En cela, on s’est beaucoup trompé. Tout le monde ne voit dans l’entreprise qu’un moyen de faire diversion aux attaques contre le Ministère et en définitive un surcroît d’impôts. (Ch. A. Julien).
aware of all the commercial advantages they could get from it. In France, the people’s discontent was growing. As a logical consequence of the extremely cold winter of 1827, the price of goods rose and affected the poorest.

Nevertheless, the Regency’s treasures (as it was proved, although at first it was denied) compensated on a very large measure the expenses (43 million) of the expedition. The situation, however, soon became anarchical in Algiers where pillage (by the French soldiers) was taking place. Moreover, the Janissaries sent to Turkey (by France) did not leave Algiers before they had destroyed all the documents useful to the administration of the country.

The administrative situation soon became chaotic and such was Algiers’ situation as a whole when France occupied the Regency in 1830. Once France took over Algiers’ Regency, and for four entire years, the French just did not know what to do about what was considered as a “costly legacy of the Restoration”.

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As one writer put rightly put it, it was “the fumbling era”\(^5\). Moreover, France’s political instability, with one government succeeding another (i.e. Second Republic following the July Monarchy, Third Republic etc...), did not make things easier either.

1.3 Situation in Algeria after 1830

There was, in June 1831, a desire to extend the French occupation further, but it was only in July 1834 that a general government for the French possessions in North Africa was created. Once the Turks had left the Regency, the situation soon became anarchical with hostilities arising from the central and western part of the country against the French. To thwart these rebellions, the French resorted to a shaky policy where individual (and often violent) initiative had free course, as in the case of General Savary who, probably being influenced by his previous task as a Minister of the Police, not only persecuted the Capital’s citizens, but even exterminated a whole tribe.

Nevertheless, and despite the military campaigns, many parts of Algeria still remained out of France’s control. In 1835-1836, France put into practice

what was called Marshal Clauzel’s “bellicose system” which, despite the sending of French troops from France for an expedition, proved to be a failure with the loss of no less than a seventh of France’s effective force. Between 1837 and 1840, there followed another policy: that of restricted occupation, whose object was to

limit the French occupation to the coastal towns such as Algiers, Oran, and Bône (now Annaba).

In order to make that policy work, Bugeaud “the white headed warrior” ⁶ (as he was called by the Arabs) was not enthusiastic about the conquest but whose opinions changed after 1840, (as it will be shown later) was sent to Algeria in order negotiate with Abd-El-Kader whose military tactics and guerrilla-like war made it very difficult for the French to capture him. On the other side, Abd-El-Kader who was seeking to settle his authority over the Tittery region, and whose determination had “brought the majority of the rebellious tribes to heal( 2), refused to negotiate with the French unless they recognized his full authority and treated him as an equal.

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⁶ Borrer, D., Campaign against the Kabailles of Algeria with the mission of Mr Suchet to the Emir Abd-El-Kader for an exchange of prisoners.
Bugeaud’s controversial move which consisted of conceding Abd-El-Kader Tlemcen and Tafna’s camp as well as the Tittery’s beylik, while France retained Oran, Arzew, Mostaganem and Mazagran in the west, in addition to

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Algiers, and part of the Mitidja in the centre, provoked anger among the French. It is noteworthy to state that the “Tafna Treaty”\(^7\), signed in May 1837, implying a peaceful co-existence between Abd-El-Kader’s Arab-state and the parts devoted to France, was considered a betrayal, i.e. Bugeaud’s to France, and most humiliating France’s desire to remain in the Constantine region and Abd-El-Kader’s to penetrate further in the East annulled the Treaty’s terms but, surprisingly, did not cause a clash between France’s and Abd-El-Kader’s armies since a two years respite (1837-1839) occurred between the two parties.

When Bugeaud made his offer of peace to Abd-El-Kader, the latter, considering that it should be taken as a national decision summoned a general assembly on the Abra’s bank on May 27\(^{th}\), 1837.

In the Eastern part, negotiation in order to come to an agreement between France and Algeria were started between General Damrémont

\(^7\) The Tafna Treaty was considered lost by France until 1951, despite the fact that there existed several copies of it: Ch.R. Ageron.
and Dey Ahmed (ruler of the Constantine region) and in which France wanted Bône and La Calle in addition to a yearly tax of 100,000 francs.

Those demands were met by Ahmed Bey’s refusal. He was relying on Turkish help. No agreement being reached between both parties, the French decided then

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that an Expedition be sent to Constantine which, despite its being encircled by the French troops, “defended itself house by house” (3.10.1837).

Constantine’s capture which, in other circumstances, would have meant France’s absolute authority, only created a new dilemma by dividing those who were in favour of a “protectorate policy” (such as Valée) and those for whom force and direct administration were the best solution (i.e. Negre).

In the meantime, Ahmed Bey’s refusal of the conditions imposed by France only renewed the fighting between the two parties. With France now gradually enclosing the whole of Algeria under her control, the resumption of hostilities was all but unavoidable between France and Abd-El-El-Kader, who, in his efforts at unification, tried to apply the Koran law, while borrowing from the Turks their administrative techniques (such as the division of his state into several administrative districts called aghaliks
which were themselves under the orders of a Khalifalik ) and from the Europeans, their military technique in 1839 saw the revival of the hostilities. As there continued to be no positive results for the French, despite the reinforcements which were sent, Thiers realized that limited occupation was no good and decided to adopt a new policy to be applied by Bugeaud who, disowning his early opinion that Algeria was a “canon attached to France”1, embarked upon a total conquest with huge forces and summarized his

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policy in a motto: “by the sword and by the plough” 8 which fortunately, was not applied to the full 9

From the military point of view, however, things soon got better for France thanks to the troops Bugeaud obtained and which allowed him to lead “a war of attrition”. Bandicourt, a “moderate” wrote:

Les zouaves, dans l’enivrement de leur victoire avec fureur sur les malheureuses créatures qui n’avaient pu fuir. Ici, un soldat amputait le sein d’une pauvre

femme qui demandait comme une grâce
d’être achevée et expirait quelques
instants après dans les souffrances ; là, un
autre soldat prenant par les jambes un
petit enfant et lui brisant la cervelle contre
la muraille ; ailleurs, c’étaient d’autres
scènes qu’un être dégradé peut seul comprendre.  

Bugeaud organised pillaging incursions and « systematic
devastation of the refractory Areas. He claimed: ”We must not run for the
Arabs, we must prevent them from sowing, reaping, grazing.” With
Abdelkader taking refuge in Marocco, the war was thought to be over, and
Algeria controlled at last (with the

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exception of Low Kabilya, which was still under the control of one of
Abdelkader’s Khalifa. In 1844, however, even the regions supposed to
be under French domination revolted under some religious brotherhoods’
appeal. On the frontier between Algeria and Morocco, for example, troops
intervened against the French who soon retaliated by outlawing
Abdelkader.

10 Julien, C.H., op. cit.
Another of their decisions was to define the borders between Algeria and Marocco in the Lalla Maghnia (town in the West of Algeria) Convention of March 18, 1845. Soon, an insurrection was organized in Oranie, Titteri and Hodna (under the supervision of a Maroccan brotherhood) while other regions such as Dahra, Cheliff and Ouarsenis (under the authority of a young ‘Cherif’ (religion man) took up arms. Repression soon followed under Pelissier who did not hesitate to asphyxiate eight hundred persons who took refuge in a grotto.  

Another insurrection led by Abdelkader in Oranie and in the Southern part took place and led the French army to a systematic ‘raking’ to make the country submit. Only two areas remained unsubdued (after Abdelkader was taken prisoner) the mountainous parts of Kabilya, independent until 1854 and the Southern Oases (subdued between 1852 and 1854).

Once the whole of Algeria was conquered (with the exception of the far South which was to remain free until the end of the century) it soon became

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11 Ageron, C. R., op. cit.
apparent that an adequate policy had to be found for the government of the ‘indigenous’. The task proved very difficult. On the other hand, the different ministries and governments which came to power in the period between 1834 (when the first general government of the French possessions came into being) and 1871 (when Algeria became ‘assimilated’ to France), made decisions which were often contradictory. Up to 1847, the confusion in which the French administration was prevented her from having a clear-cut policy about Algeria. On the contrary, the ‘indigenous policy’ was often decided “on the spot”). The changes which occurred in the French administration (with the creation of an “Arabs-Chief post” (Muslim or French) by the governor, then a “Bureau Arabe” (1833-34) and then a “Direction of Arab Affairs” (1837-39) which inturn was suppressed and replaced by a protectoral policy, actually reflected the state of chaos in which it was. Those administrators who came after Valée put into practice decisions taken earlier, while Bugeaud was coming back to the Turkish Bey’s system of the Maghzens (administrations).

Another decision was to adopt Abdelkader’s organization by applying an indirect governmental rule by Arab Chiefs, belonging either to the military or to the religious aristocracy. In doing so, the French

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12 Ibid.
military regime maintained a different policy in each Algerian region. They also received orders to limit the

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indigenous authority and influence by not only dividing them (by favouring one to the other) but opposing them to each other also. Despite this policy of “divide to rule”, the officers and the military regime soon attracted the Colonists’ hostility because they saw in them “the protectors of the indigenous”. The year 1841 had huge psychological (as well as economic) consequences for the Algerians because of the ‘assimilation policy’ which, with the application of the French law, saw the Cadis’ (judges) jurisdiction suppressed and which thus meant the destruction of the Muslim institutions.

It is only after 1840 that colonization had a semblance of organization. Before that date, people whose origin was rather questionable came to Algeria, from various parts of Europe, Spain, Balearics, Malta, and Italy, in addition to some French whom France was trying to get rid of because of their taking part in political demonstrations. All these immigrants formed a heterogeneous group. Of the twenty-five thousand Europeans who were established in Algeria in 1839, only eleven thousands were French. Besides, Bugeaud’s attempt to create three agricultural and military colonies proved a failure, despite the
appropriation by France of religious lands upon which a sequestration was opposed because of their being owned by tribes which had risen against France. The Turkish beylik (administration) lands as well as those which were considered as untilled were also declared ‘state owned.’ The verification of land property titles which was

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attempted in 1844 and 1846 through some Decrees soon proved to be ‘spoliation’ of no less than two hundred thousand hectares. As an example, in the Algiers region, and on the one hundred and sixty-eight thousand hectares checked, no less than ninety-five thousands were taken by the state, thirty seven thousands were taken by Europeans and only eleven thousands were given to Algerians. As a result, most indigenous collectivists were driven into a corner and forced to sell very cheaply their remaining plot of ground and emigrate.

When Bugeaud left Algeria, the number of Europeans was 109,400 of whom 47,274 were French who were trying to set themselves ‘free from French trusteeship’ by guaranteeing that Algeria was part of the French territory. That was true in 1845 for at least the part of the civilian territory which was assimilated to France upon which was applied (through the 1847 ordinance) “French rule on the Communes”.
This example only reflected the colonial concept which when applied, recognised the French citizens and the “naturalised” Europeans, by giving them the freedom and rights of those in France. Another effect of that concept was to create, according to Lyautey “des citoyens majorés.”

In France, the Metropolitans kept thinking that assimilation was undertaken in order to “civilise the Arabs.” That was probably the reason why the Métropole favoured colonial claims made in the name of assimilation. The Conflict that arose between the civilians (colonists) and military soon proved that situation untrue.

When the Second Republic took place, during the 1848 Revolution, the French colonists, with all impunity, carried on their assimilation policy. Behind that policy, however, lay their claim to ‘‘administer Algeria by themselves.’ Their fear of the military regime proved unnecessary as despite its strong influence upon the French government, the colonists still continued to be favoured as they were given the right to elect municipal councillors, representing a total of two-thirds of those elected, whereas only a third represented the Muslims.
Nevertheless, even those elections were abolished in 1850 as the French citizens in Algeria (colonists) continued to think that the indigenous did not deserve the electoral right. Another attempt was made by the 1848 constitution to integrate Algeria into the French territory so that it would follow France’s rule in civil services such as justice and the customs. From December 1845 the civilian territories were divided into three departments, which were subdivided into divisions and communes and administered by prefects, sub-prefects and ‘maires’.

Mixed and Arab territories on the other hand, were kept under military rule, with an indirect Indigenous administration. Needless to say the Central Direction for Arab Affairs continued to be Suspected by colonists as Military’s tool against them (and, thus, in favour of the Arabs) was suppressed in 1858.

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The Second Republic wanted once for all to solve then delicate problem of land ownership by assimilating it to the system of property owning in France. Because of a distorted project (presented by the colonists) and which pretended that private property did not exist in Algeria, a law was passed which stipulated that the French state was in possession of all the forests. When this law was put into effect, many
Algerians found themselves expelled from their traditional domain or had to live in infraction of the law.

Another France’s essential concern was colonisation itself. To get rid of the subversive elements (i.e. those who participated in riot in France) the French Assembly granted fifty million francs. Those who were unemployed asked for and obtained free concessions in Algeria. Of the 100,000 who applied, 20,000 were accepted and settled in 42 newly built villages. The harsh conditions they encountered soon obliged 7,000 of them to return to France while 3,000 died. For the Muslims, the period 1845-51, referred to as “the Misery Years”, was characterised by epidemics. Besides, the economic crisis the Fellahs had to endure was aggravated by 3 years of drought and swarms of locusts. Death was also due to cholera (1845-51) greatly reduced the Algerian population which was 2,324,000 by 1851.

From 1852 to 1858, another military era occurred in which the military could apply all the rules they wanted, to the great anger of the civilians. Marshall

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Randon achieved important things for the French colonists. He encouraged the building of 56 new villages (between 1853 and 1859) as well as the settlement of 15,000 more peasants. Under his rule, a policy called
“the cantonnement policy” in which the land of no less than 16 tribes comprising more than 300,000 hectares (of which 61,363 were taken by the state) were appropriated in return for a so-called “right to individual or collective land-property” to Algerians.

Thanks to that policy and to a massive injection of capital (private) and the creation of Algeria’s Bank (later in 1881) and thanks to the suppression of tariff-barriers between French and Algerian commerce, the economy was boosted. The Bureaux Arabes, which were under the supervision of the military, attempted to involve the Muslims in these economic schemes. Unfortunately, the success of these schemes did not last long mainly because of the huge taxes the Fellahs had to pay to the French. The colonists remained very hostile to what they called “the regime of the sabre” and soon led a campaign against the military upon whom there was strong pressure. This attracted public opinion within France and forced Napoleon III’s regime to suppress it in June 1858.

After 1858, Algeria became France’s “guinea pig” in the administrative field. A new assimilation policy was tried in which the administrative services were

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13 « Nous sommes en présence d’une nationalité armée et vivace qu’il faut éteindre par l’assimilation » wrote Minister Napoléon Jérome in 1858.
included in the “Ministry for Algeria and the Colonies”. Algeria became under the direct rule of France. Civilian rule, as a result, was reinforced with the creation of six new sub-prefects as well as new civilian trusteeship in military territories. The civilian officers soon replaced the military ones without any positive result especially for the Muslims. Total assimilation was felt necessary by the civilian regime whose members wanted, at all costs, to “dislocate the Arabs” (1), to weaken the Caid’s authority and create a division between the landowners and their “khammes”

This resulted in the complete destruction of the Algerian economy and the suppression of the Muslim justice which was established in 1854. The Muslims were henceforth obliged to refer to French tribunals. This was presented as a great offence to them and forced some chiefs to emigrate to other Muslim countries. There soon followed a deep conflict between the military (who denounced the civilian abuses) and the colonists themselves (who wanted at all costs to retain power, so that they could apply whatever rule they wanted).

The conflict was such that an inquiry was felt necessary in 1860 by Napoleon III. “Algeria Ministry” was effectively suppressed in November 1860. During the brief period of civilian rule 1858-60, the colonists had to build no less than 16

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14 Ageron II entendait... »désagrégé la tribu en favorisant la rupture des liens entre propriétaires et Khammes ». 
“villages of colonization” and to get 4,6000 free concessions. The effect of this injustice created a situation which caused (either directly or indirectly) the Aures (in the East) insurrection in 1859, that of the Hodna in 1860, as well as that of the Ouled Sidi Cheikh (in the West) in 1864 in addition to those of the Tell in Oranie (West), Dahra and Beni Menacer.

In 1868, another administrative organization was decided upon, as a result of which governmental and administrative matters were all centralized in Algeria. Napoleon III’s declaration, which provoked so much fuss among the colonists, “Algeria is not a colony but an Arab kingdom” and in which he encouraged a “perfect equality between the indigenous and the Europeans” as well as the reconciliation of the races, reflected the policy he attempted in Algeria through the Supreme Council for Muslim Law.  

As a result, new religious buildings were built. The pilgrimage to Mecca re-instated also, but, despite their “rapprochement policy”, the Bureaux Arabes continued, often in a contradictory way, to oppose the Algerian chiefs. In spite of the restrictions put upon the development of

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15 Conseil Supérieur du droit musulman pour l’interprétation de la loi coranique et la réorganisation de la justice musulmane (1866).
rural colonisation, 22 villages were built in 1870 as well as more than 116,000 hectares given to the colonists and 4,000 new ones installed.

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Drought and an invasion of locusts provoked famine which lasted from November 1867 to June 1868 which, added to cholera, liked 3000,000 people. More than before, this catastrophic situation was seen by the French colonists as the military’s responsibility. A return to civilian administration and assimilation was demanded. Once again, the government attempted in 1868 the application of a policy which would reconcile the colonists’ aspirations with the indigenous’ interests.

This project, called “the Randon Behic constitution was resolutely opposed to absolute assimilation and allowed the Algerians to have a “budgetary autonomy” with civilian and indigenous departments. It was, as expected, opposed by the colonists who saw the “political rights” given to the Muslims as “hurting” the French population.

1870 saw the triumph of the colonists who voted for the installation of a civilian regime in March 1870. Their main goal was to extend French colonisation without taking into account the Algerians upon whom was imposed a decree of the Olivier government which meant that the French
colonists could, with all impunity take Algerian land. Resistance was not anticipated from the Algerians since despite their rejection of the colonists’ domination, they were considered too weak to revolt. When a French colonist said that 40 million French should be given priority he was only reflecting their ideas.

The downfall of the Empire gave birth to the colonists’ Rebellion who were determined to have another civilian regime. The whole Algeria soon became a hotbed of intrigue and agitation, with the “Revolutionary Commune” at whose head the French colonists were trying not only to overthrow the command imposed by the French government but to ensure their own independence also from it. The 1871 Algerian insurrection, which immediately broke out, had four main causes which were: the Muslims’ deep dissatisfaction with the French settlers’ injustice, the set up of the civilian regime, the disasters of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, and finally Algeria’s desire to retrieve its independence.

Soon, the relationship between the Muslims and the Europeans (which was already explosive) became so bad that even the central
government in Paris got alarmed. Moreover, the set-up, once again, of the civilian regime did nothing to lessen the tension between the Algerians and the French settlers.

Those of the Algerians who were hostile to the new regime and were also conscious of all abuses it might cause (having already experienced them) joined forces. More half of the population took part in 1871 insurrection when it started and whose causes (apart from those already mentioned) were also to try to prevent the French attempts of assimilation of the Algerian population.

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No doubt, the number of Algerians involved in, the insurrection proved that it was not a local Movement led by Mohamed El Mokrani but rather an attempt to stop the French hegemony. The repression which followed intended fist to “tame the Algerians” and, second, to procure both land and money for the colonists. As a result, the insurgent population had to pay (as a compensation for the cost of the war) nearly sixty five million francs, or equivalent to 70.4% of the capital of the concerned indigenous who took part in the revolt. For most of the tribes, such a situation simply meant bankruptcy as it took many of them up to twenty years for the total discharge of their debts. On the whole, the defeat of the 1871 insurrection meant the total political victory of the French
colonists who could thus impose their will without being stopped by the military. Ageron, Ch, R. (1974, 45) mentioned: “la défaite des insurgés assura la victoire politique des colons. Les Français d’Algérie imposèrent dés lors presque sans contrepoids leurs volontés. » When the Ottomans took over Egypt in 1517 (after it had been ruled by the Mamelukes for 267 years), they reorganized the administration and took large areas of land for the state. The power was in the Viceroy’s hands. By the seventeenth century however, the situation changed, as the Viceroy not only lost influence but no longer controlled the administration, the tax system, nor even the land that was reclaimed by the Turkish authorities. From the 18th century onwards, it became evident that it was the Mamelukes (mostly military men) who,

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like the Odjak in Algeria, ruled the country making it a military rather than a civilian one.

Egypt’s situation which was already bad (from the economic and social viewpoints) even worsened with the European intervention. France, which was desperately seeking a market for her woolen cloth as well as for a steady food supply, dramatically increased the volume of trade with Egypt. As a result of that action, and of other European
commercial activities, Egypt’s commercial position was sharply weakened, leading to a monopoly (by European merchants) of Egypt’s European trade.

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1.4 Conclusion

In 1798, and after the French army occupied Egypt, efforts were made by Britain to destroy France’s position in Egypt, and thus led her to occupy it (though for a short period of time) twice.
Another consequence of Egypt's occupation by France led to the takeover of the Eastern Mediterranean by Britain which was justified by her interest in Egypt as a “link in their channel of communication with India”, their most precious acquisition.
In the early nineteenth century, Mohamed Aly’s goal was to bring Turkey to recognize him as an independent ruler. Under his reign, a large modern army was created but had as a negative result the need for more revenues as well as institutions to sustain it. The introduction of the cotton culture for export was achieved in 1821. Another achievement by the government was the creation of projects for new social institutions controlled by a highly centralized system of government called “khedivate” by the Europeans.

2.2. Egypt: the Situation before 1882

In addition to economic actions imposed upon Egypt, Europe began in 1875, to interfere politically in her affairs, causing Khedive Ismail’s deposition and exile in 1879 as well as the, disappearance of the kind of absolute power exercised by the Khedives (or Viceroyos) and which was also the result of social and institutional changes in the state composition between 1845 and 1874. The situation also gave birth to a new body of officials who controlled the bureaucratic domain and thus kept themselves away from the Viceroy’s rule.

Some of these officials sided with Europe and tried to make the ruler give up not only power but also his financial resources. Others, being aware of the negative outcome of the European interference in these affairs, joined the
movement of protest against Europe which was very attractive in the capital and in the countryside.

In the meantime, Egypt’s relationship with Europe changed, dramatically as she became a “receiver” of manufactured goods and a provider of raw materials. This change was not only due to the world economic and political factors but also to the sharp growth of European influence and the loss of the Viceroy’s influence over the Europeans settled in Egypt.

Egypt became then more and more dependent upon Europe owing mainly to an increase in “merchant” Capitalism, the establishment of regular steamship lines, the actions of the European governments in support of their nationals in Egypt and the “determination of Mohamed Aly and his successors to rule Egypt independently of Ottoman control”\textsuperscript{16} together with their determination to act as a mediator between Egypt and Europe.

\textsuperscript{16} F. R. Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives, 1805-1879: from household government to modern bureaucracy, University of Pittsburg, 1984, p. 37.
By 1870, Egypt’s situation was such that it was no more than a “client state” with its “delta provinces” forming one vast export sector in the commercial system of the world.

This new international context gave birth to a series of changes which later culminated in the British takeover of Egypt. The first of these changes was the

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introduction of a long-fiber cotton industry which could not have developed had it not been followed by the building of railways, the erection of new port cities, the improvement in the water way system, and other facilities.

Egypt’s administrative system was further stimulated by the cotton boom that occurred earlier between 1862-64 and obliged the Viceroy to transfer administrative authority from the central to the regional government and to create new regional agricultural, judicial, and administrative institutions.

Another change occurred with the advent of European consuls representing the European community’s interests. The third, and probably the most important factor in Egypt’s downfall, was the accumulation of a
huge public debt which further caused her bankruptcy. Once these public loans started, it seemed that there was no possible way for any ruler, to stop them. The more money the Egyptians borrowed, the more dependent they became on the Europeans. Besides, the high interest rates demanded by the lenders made the whole issue even more difficult. As far as the administrative sector was concerned, the creation of distinct administrative and agricultural councils had a deep influence upon life in Egypt because it constituted a link between government and society, made the new administrative elite more important, and changed the process of politics as well as it separated the ruler’s functions from those of the administration.

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From the political point of view, the years before 1882 saw dramatic changes. There was first the rise of Egyptian nationalism whose objectives were twofold: Firstly, fight the Turks ’injustice toward the majority of Egyptians under Turkish rule, and secondly rise against the “infidels.” The religious aspect of the Egyptian early nationalists should not, however, be underestimated in the
sense that behind it lay important political reasons. Some of those Egyptians sensed that Egypt’s difficulties should be attributed to those Europeans who were keeping it in a state of deep financial and economic subordination.

From the French and British point of view, their support for the Khedive’s government only showed their determination not to allow any interference in Egypt’s financial affairs arising from another country. There were further difficulties arising from the European creditors’ lack of confidence in the Egyptian assembly which made a commission of liquidation and enquiry necessary and whose main tasks were “to estimate the total maintainable revenue of Egypt, to assess her minimum essential expenditure and to allocate the difference among the holders of the debt.”¹⁷ This international commission had some positive effect in the sense that its recommendations slightly favoured Egypt (at her creditors’ expense).

What neither Riaz nor Baring, or de Blignière (representing Egypt, Britain and France in the international Commission of Liquidation) seemed to understand was that the crisis which occurred in the early 1880’s was due to the conflict that emerged from their struggle for political power. On the one hand, there was Britain’s conviction that “What Egypt needed were European techniques applied under European control.” On the other hand, there were the Egyptians Nationalists who were all but to cede political decision to either the British or the French. The conflict for power that arose out of the competition between the Khedive’s government and the rising Egyptian nationalism made it clear that the only way to solve it was the use of force which since it was not available within Egypt itself (the Egyptian army was co-operating with the nationalists) would have to come either from the Sultan or from Europe itself.

Egypt’s position became explosive in the summer of 1881 when the Khedive’s opponents created a need for Britain to send in more European officials. This situation, in return, provoked a rise in the Muslim feelings against the “infidels.” The military demonstration led by Arabi in September 1881 and in which he demanded the rebuilding of the army to 18,000 men, the dismissal of Riaz and the convocation of the Assembly, among other things, only gave Britain the feeling that in order to make the situation in Egypt straight, an urgent

18 Ibid.
solution had to be applied, i.e. an armed intervention and the crushing of Arabi’s nationalist movement.

On the other hand, Arabi’s movement which although successful, was nonetheless worth taking into consideration, for it meant that an almost entire people was trying to get rid of the rule (and the injustice it brings about) of a minorities prerogative (i.e. the Tyrks) as well as attempting to establish its own governmental constitutions and thus, in doing so, challenging the European powers who, by favouring that minority’s domination, wanted the Egyptians to remain under their own “thumbs.”

Arabi’s impact on the movement he set up was strong enough (despite his lack of political experience) to make him enjoy the sympathy of the majority of his fellow countrymen. Moreover, he had the army and the police at his disposal. His war cry “Egypt for Egyptian” had a deep religious implication (just like Abd-el Kader’s movement in the 1830’s) which, it is interesting to note, was not one-sided.

As a matter of fact, the British also invoked (as the French did before Algiers’ occupation in the late 1820’s, when Charles X in the same of all Christians was encouraged to organize a crusade in order to avenge
religion), the religious motive when, just after Tel-El- Kebir’s British victory over Arabi’s

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troops, Sir E. Malet, addressed the British troops in these terms: “You have fought the battle of Christendom, and history will acknowledge this.”

In reality, however, that victory meant something perhaps more important (for the Liberals in power then) and which France also sought during her occupation of Algiers, that is to say “a new lease of popularity and (even more) power.

Having still in mind the Indian mutiny of 1857-1859, Britain, nevertheless, in spite of her victory, was ready to indulge in underestimating Egypt’s national sentiment, which, if joined together with the religious one, could represent a danger no less serious than that represented by the Indian mutiny earlier on. Besides, the British officials

20 Ibid.
having drawn a good lesson from the latter saw in religion, in this case Islam, “a dangerous instigator of revolt against European influence.”

There was an even greater apprehension, show by both France and Britain, of a revolt which would spread from North Africa to India, with Egypt as its very core.

No doubt the “First Joint Note” which in an implicit way implied annexation, which united the Egyptian military and the civilian nationalists. The

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consequence was that the Europeans (more specifically the French and the British) felt that such a move would create the possibility of Egyptian self-government. That was one of the reasons for the British intervention in Egypt in 1882. In doing so, Britain destroyed the National Party, restored the Khedive’s rule (which surprisingly enough weakened his authority instead of strengthening it), and reduced to nil the Egyptians’ hope of governing themselves by themselves.

21 In his published diaries for 1882, Blunt W.S. referred to the Anglo-French fear of an uprising via the Islamic World, from North Africa to India.
If we analyse the whole movement, i.e. the outburst of Egyptian Nationalism, we can say that its origins were various and complex. First of all, there was the hostility of the Egyptian professional officers in the army toward the Turkish ruling class in “their alleged preference for Caucasian officers.”

Secondly, there was the religious factor which gave birth to Islamic nationalism, and hence remained a theme of discord in Egypt-English relations for seventy-five years and finally the “indigenous” discontent against a “domestic despotism” sustained by foreign influence. This discontent, however, remained complex in its nature in that, if it is true that The Egyptian nationalists were against the ruling Turkish minority, it is worth noticing that they both (Egyptians and Turks alike) resented, with some exceptions such as Riaz Pasha in the 1890’s who was willingly co-operating with the British and was the direct cause of a deep ministerial crisis, the British rule. Another reason for the...

Egyptians to be grateful was that the British had come in addition to relieve them from foreign financial control. Such a mission was then supposed to ensure a permanent British influence. There was, however, a contradiction between Britain’s claim that she had come to free Egypt from Turkish rule and her desire to have a strong Khedive (with an English Financial Controller). This was perhaps explained by, on the one hand, Britain’s foreign policy (a strong Khedive means a strong Sultan, and, thus, an efficient bulwark against England’s traditional enemy: Russia) and, on the other hand, by the Whigs’ conviction that Orientals were incapable of self-government.

The same uncertainty (as to what to do about Egypt) faced England (as it had faced France in Algeria in the period 1830-1834). Besides, the conflict that arose between the Whigs and their opponents about that matter made a compromise vital. Internal opposition was not the only problem the government had to face. There arose almost immediately after the English occupation a rivalry between France and England about how to rule Egypt. Britain’s proposal of replacing Anglo-French control with a British financial advisor was refused.
even after Britain offered as compensation to France the presidency of the “Caisse de la Dette.”

Among the members of the government, there was at least one thing they agreed upon: that neither direct nor indirect rule was to be applied. After the period of uncertainty and chaos, it was at last decided that reforms both in the legal and administrative domains were to be made and supervised by British officials. The former national and religious court which had jurisdiction over the natives and the mixed tribunals and consular courts which used to deal with those foreigners protected by the “Capitulation” were to be reformed.

Egypt’s “independence”, it was thought, was to be maintained thanks to two institutions, a legislative Council with thirty members of whom 14 were to be appointed and 16 nominated by regional councils and a General Assembly composed of 82 members of whom 46 were elected and the rest were Ministers and Members of the Legislative Council. There was thus a semblance of democracy in the way these councils were elected to the way French used to “nominate” or impose rather than elect the members of those councils in Algeria.

As far as Egypt’s political status was concerned, it is true that there was no direct rule imposed by Britain (for it was not the British but rather the
Unofficially, Egypt was considered as a "veiled protectorate." In fact, it was a mixture of veiled protectorate and indirect rule in the sense that if it is true that the Turks were officially ruling the country, it is even truer (as we will see later) that the real rulers were the British.

2.3 Egypt: The Situation after 1882

As a protectorate, Egypt was benefitting from the English financial "co-operation" rather than help. The result deriving from such a position, brought about tremendous (both positive and negative) changes in Egyptian political, social and economic structures. The positive result was that Egypt's finances (as we shall see later) were somehow eased.

The negative effect was that such a situation created a deep feeling of frustration among the Egyptian Nationalists whose primary aim was to free Egypt from foreign rule. Now, they found they had to deal with two opposing forces instead of one for while the Turkish actions were visible, the British were not because they kept operating behind the "Turkish"
screen. They gradually came to realize that they were “struggling against an enemy who disappeared behind a smokescreen of verbiage.”

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Moreover, the religious reform movement which acquired an increase in its importance in the period 1882-1906, because of the European occupation, shed even more light on Egyptian leaders such as Shaykh Mohammed Abduh and Mustapha Kamil who although they resented the Sultan’s and Khedives’s tyranny and believed in Egypt’s independence, thought that since they had no other choice, it was better for them to continue their loyalty to the sultan because he constituted for them the only guarantee against the Europeans.

Had they to choose between two ills, the Egyptian masses would probably have chosen the Ottomans for they, at least, were bound with the same religion. Meantime, the British statesmen kept assuring everyone around them that the British occupation was to be withdrawn soon, or at least as soon as Egypt’s financial independence was achieved. It soon became apparent that the Egyptians would much prefer “open

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annexation” (which was out of the question for England for she had pledged her honour)\(^{25}\) for it would at least have shown them in whose hands responsibility lay.

England’s victory over Egypt, on the other hand, and her assurance that the latter was in her “firm hands”, did not arouse in her, as some would probably have expected, bellicose sentiments concerning the defense of her newly acquired

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territory, towards the other powers (especially France which was directly involved in Egypt).

Conversely, while reinforcing her grip, upon Egypt, she was also trying to avoid provoking unnecessarily a war with these powers, especially after she abolished unilaterally the Dual Control soon after Tel-El-kebir. Now, her mission was to abolish the “Caisse de la Dette” and the foreign Capitulation under which foreigners resident in Egypt had a “compounded” privileged position, i.e. immunity from practically all

\(^{25}\)ibid.
taxation and judicial prosecution at a time when Egypt was desperately in need of increased revenue.\textsuperscript{26}

Another urgent mission the British ascribed to themselves was to get rid of international rights of interference in Egyptian affairs and finances. Another reality the Egyptians were beginning to face was that since the Khedivial authority was restored, thanks to the British arms, the Khedive himself as well as the Egyptian administration and public concerns were soon to be ruled under not only the supervision but also the control of the British agent and Consul General despite the fact that there could be no possible danger from the Nationalists, i.e. from Arabi’s army since it had been abolished. All the forces needed for the reinforcement of the Khedive’s authority was provided by the British army, for they wanted to take no risks.

Barings second arrival in Egypt (for he previously represented British bondholders as British Commissioner on the “Caisse de la Dette” in 1879 and was later granted the post of Financial Secretary under

\textsuperscript{26} Yatikiotis, P.J., op.cit.
Viceroy L. Ripon in 1879) in September 1883 was to reinforce the idea of how important Egypt was gradually becoming for the British. More and more people were now speaking in terms of her strategic importance (as a precious short cut to the route to India) and the necessity to restore her financial condition and protect the Europeans ’interests.

Britain, however, was facing a serious crisis in the application of her imperial policy which, in turn, created a contradiction in her position, for while she was strengthening it in Egypt, she was confronted, on the other hand, by international interference about the law of liquidation which she knew could not be changed without the assent of the other powers interested (like her) in the protection of European investments in Egypt.

The London conference, where Britain hoped to obtain its own financial surplus and a right to contract a loan abroad in order to finance urgent obligations, was bound to be a failure, for too many nations were involved and too many “diverging” interests were at stake. The Austrians, the Germans, the Italians, as well as the Russians, were not willing to help her in her designs which they thought were opposed to their own.

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Nevertheless, if Britain was eager to obtain more freedom of action in Egypt, she was not willing (as we have already seen) to cause any
international conflict, nor was she, on the other hand, ready to abandon her desire to get a loan of £9 million together with a provisional reduction of interest on funded debt (March 1885). Thanks to that loan, the “Alexandria indemnities” could at last be paid off and some irrigation work started. The race against bankruptcy was on.²⁷

But before that, Egypt’s conditions had to be assessed. The report of Lord Dufferin (then British Ambassador to Constantinople) formed a sort of basic structure to the British reform-policy in Egypt. The Organic Law (decree) of 1 May 1883 provided (as we have already seen) for a partly elected and partly nominated legislative Council whose aim was to examine the Budget and all “government sponsored legislation bearing upon the administration of the country.”²⁸ The reform was also to deal with the restructuring of the administration, the finances of the state and the judiciary field which also constituted important elements of that reform. In his report, Lord Dufferin recommended the granting of advisory posts to British officials in essential domains such as justice, Police, Army, Interior, Finance, Irrigation and Public Works, which only sharpened Egyptian opposition to foreign occupation, but this did not prevent Britain from carrying out other measures such as the Civil and Criminal codes which were to regulate the newly established Native Tribunals in

²⁸ Yatikiotis, P.J., op.cit.
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1884. No less important (at least for those who had to endure it daily during their conscribed labour) was the abolition of the “Kurbaj” (whipping) which was used for the collection of taxes and rents.

The steps made towards ending bankruptcy were, however, too slow owing to the fact that the charges on Egyptian revenue were heavily burdened with expenses such as the tribute due to the Sultan, various pensions and the Khedive’s which contributed to a total of almost £6 million. Another reason for this lack of progress was that the revenue had to be proportional to the reduced interest on Egypt’s funded debt.

So, the opportunities for making economies were only too scarce. Another reason was Britain’s attempts to get hold of any excess which would derive from the revenue devoted to debt service. However, there were some substantial positive results such as the 1884 increase by 20% of the Delta cotton production thanks mainly to the repairing of the Delta Barrage by conscripted workers which gave France the opportunity to argue about their suggestions to abolish the “corvée” (forced labour) for the yearly cleaning of irrigation channels and which was to be abolished by 1890.
The resumption of the full payment of interest due in April 1887 was made possible thanks to a more rigid regulation of the economy and to an improvement.

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in agricultural productivity and a better financial management. More money consisting of a “reserve fund” of £ million to pay for possible claims from Khedive Ismail and his family was given by the powers to the Egyptian government in 1888 as well as another amount of money added to the “authorized” expenditure of Egypt by the powers to replace conscripted labour by remunerated work. One of the obvious results of all these changes was that by 1890; Egyptian revenue went beyond £10 million.

Reforms were also introduced during Riad Pasha’s Ministry in the police and the Army. Unfortunately, these constitutional institutions were given no power to control the “Khedive’s autocracy” concerning domestic affairs. Moreover, and despite the fact that in the poorest areas the land tax was reduced by 30%, the peasants’ problems remained.
The officials were conscious that the peasants’ indebtedness was a major difficulty, but they decided that they should be further burdened with a payment of £4 million of compensation for the damage caused by the European community suffered by the European community of Alexandria, all of which was directly or indirectly attributable to British naval bombardment; and for good measure they added the costs of the British military occupation. 29

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For more or less the same reason (war-damages), the Algerians were obliged to give the French three quarters of their income as compensation. A system of provincial guards called “ghaffirs” was implemented in 1883. The whole country was divided, from the administrative point of view, into three police territories, each of them supervised by a European inspector. By 1894, another reform was launched. It consisted of the establishment within the Ministry of the Interior and a Public Health Department. Province governors and district officers were to take over jurisdiction over crime and the police.

The establishment of these reforms and institutions all bore a contradictory aspect in the sense that none of them was given enough power to bring about positive results. Obviously, the Egyptian Nationalists were aware not only of these contradictions, but also of the false position Egypt and themselves alike were placed in; but, being disillusioned and especially scattered, in 1883, they could not stand against them nor against the powers which represented them.

That the Europeans had come to bring order and prosperity out of “chaos and bankruptcy” constituted no doubt for the British government and Colvin’s The Making of Modern Egypt summarised the British official mind and policy at that period (1883) in the following terms:

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Never again would a mutinous army be in possession of the soil of Egypt. Never again would there be an Alexandria massacre. Never again Would Europeans be driven from their
homes ‘in Egypt’ by the scowl of the fanatic or the rancour of the mob.\textsuperscript{30}

Europeans in Egypt could not believe that British soldiers had been sent today to be withdrawn tomorrow. There was a long task to be accomplished; and, until it was accomplished, the redcoat would answer for order.\textsuperscript{31}

Thanks to these assurances, the manufacturer, the merchant, and the investor alike felt secure, for that meant a prosperous future and for the investor it meant security. Again, the question of how long the British would stay in Egypt remained unanswered. The British opinion, which, on the whole, was against an extended stay in Egypt at the beginning (The French opinion also, had a similar attitude at the beginning of the French occupation of Algeria), was gradually moving towards a lengthy stay.

Salisbury, however, mainly owing to French opposition, was not inclined to give the idea a free rein, nor could he afford to hold Britain aloof by letting his policy go too far in this direction. A possible solution to the situation came in the

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\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
form of a proposal made by Mukhtar Pasha to raise a new Egyptian Army which would allow the British troops to evacuate. Unfortunately, this was turned down.

As the 1880’s were nearing their end, it was becoming more and more obvious that the debt pretext could no longer be taken seriously, as it was in the beginning (since Egypt’s financial position was no longer as acute as it was in 1882). The British government found itself faced with a dilemma. It was true that the British had gone into Egypt but how long there were to stay there remained a question no-one could answer, not even the officials. But as she became more and more involved in Egypt, it became clear that she was less and less wishing to leave.

There was that “lifebuoy” for the British officials (giving them thus more reason to stay) in the form of a “timely” Mahdist threat. So, they had now a very valid cause for the maintenance of their army and neither Gladstone nor Granville would leave the country “defenseless.” In addition, what made Britain remain so long despite the arguments for evacuation, was that those in favour of a lengthy occupation were always stronger than those against it. Another argument was that they could not possibly leave the country without having first secured that a “sympathetic Khedivial regime” could be left behind.
Salisbury’s policy, when he replaced Gladstone in June 1885, was slightly more subtle. He agreed to evacuate “at some date” in the not distant future, but what he wanted most was to make sure that once the British had left, there would remain a permanent British supremacy and influence. But he was, however, aware that such a thing could only be possible if the Sultan was ready to permit Britain to come back to Egypt whenever it wanted to in case of trouble. Needless to say France strongly opposed such a scheme and was soon joined by Turkey’s traditional rival in the Eastern Mediterranean, i.e. Russia.

The second Drummond Wolf Commission in May 1887, however, saw Britain’s acceptance to evacuate Egypt within 3 years but keep nonetheless to return to Egypt in case of disorder. The sequence of events however contradicted (as we shall see later) this assurance whose terms, again satisfied neither French nor Russia.

Another aspect of the British occupation remained also vague: that of how much British interference there should be in the Egyptian
administration. The 1884 crisis over the Sudan brought a clear answer from Granville who formally stated that in important matters, Egyptian officials had to take British advice or else they would lose their office.

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British influence in administrative matters continued to increase both in important and unimportant matters until the “area of Egyptian decision was close to zero.”\textsuperscript{32} The Khedive’s government continued to exist (the British having excluded annexation) but only on a symbolic basis. It is interesting to note at this point that while the Khedive’s authority was reduced to nil (as opposed to the British) it remained total and tyrannical towards the Egyptian people.

In any case, Britain’s motives mingled after all; it was the Tory Imperialists’ financial interests, together with the press, that pushed the liberal government in power in 1882 to intervene in Egypt. The British officials (brought from India) were soon met by clashes between Egyptian

\textsuperscript{32} Richmond, J.C.B., op. cit.
and Turko-Circassian Officials in their effort to improve Justice and Interior Ministries.

Another dilemma faced the British as to how to reinforce and at the same time reform what they considered as the “legitimate authority” of the Khedive. In the end, financial as well as imperial motives overwhelmed the interior reforms that were to take place. Another sort of conflict arose over British control into the domain of the police and the native courts. The British were sharply blamed for their interference in Egyptian internal affairs. Such a situation created a clash between the European and “Oriental” traditions which bore an ideological content, and it is the rather elaborate judicial system which consisted of (1) mixed

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courts, (2) consular courts, (3) Sharia (Muslim Religious Law) Court and the National Courts (for criminal legal authority over ordinary Egyptians) which was at the centre of this clash between the British and the Egyptian Ministers who viewed the increase (encouraged and supported by Baring’s policy) of European judges as interfering and unfair.

There was a substantial improvement in Egypt’s financial affairs at the beginning of 1890 which, although perhaps not entirely, lessened somewhat the international pressure put on Britain because of her
Egyptian policy. Thanks to that, the British Consul General could devote his time to one of his most important tasks, i.e. to get complete control of the Khedive’s administration. The 1890’s saw a revival of Egyptian Nationalism which, unlike Algeria’s (which bore the aspect of an armed struggle against the forces of occupation) was much more intellectual than anything else. It might seem odd but it is the Arabi movement, which was a military one, which gave rise to this intellectual movement against foreign occupation in the sense that it was composed originally of three main Egyptian groups, i.e. the Egyptian officers who wanted to destroy the Turco-Circassian influence on the army, the Turco-Egyptian landowners who wanted to share the Khedive’s rule, and the educated Egyptians, such as Mohammed Abduh, who was a muslim reformer and Abdulah Naim who was an

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intellectual, who mostly wanted reforms in Egypt’s policy making. What united such a socially dissimilar group was a sense (although still in a primary state)
of Egyptian identity, together with a total refusal of foreign control. In these nationalists’ minds the national sense of identity often intermingled with Muslim identity, the same way it did in Algeria under Abd-el Kader. The fissure that existed between the constitutionalists in early 1882 seriously damaged the Nationalist Coalition, especially after Tel-El-Kebir. Because of this weakening in their position, the British control was able to advance steadily. In this respect, Richmond, J.C.B. notes: “No effective opposition survided to knit the steady extension of British control during the remaining 5 years of Tewfik’s Khedivate.”

This advance, made possible thanks to the financial success obtained by Baring and his “steady erosion of the area left to Egyptian decision”33, created a stream of acquired ideas about a British stereotype of Egyptian people as “likeable but unfortunate, but at the bottom contemptible because they seemed to lack the military virtues, (such was also the idea of the Turks and later the French about the Algerians), and to be of mixed racial origins.”34

33 Richmond, J.C.B., op. cit.
34 Ibid.
Kitchener reinforced even more these ideas when he wrote in 1912:

“The Egyptians are not a
nation...They are a fortuitous agglomeration of miscellaneous and hybrid elements.” It is probably because of considerations like these that Cromer kept believing that “subject people were better served by good government (i.e. British government) than by self-government.

His conviction was that if the debt problem was resolved and agricultural taxation lightened, there would no longer be any opportunity for nationalist restlessness. The last fifteen years of his reign proved to him that such was not the case, and the way he overreacted to nationalist opposition only gave rise to the deep criticism of his administration after 1892.

Despite these ups and downs, in the British control of Egypt, one fact remained sure: Baring’s (and through him Britain’s position) continued to be powerful and no incident could show it more Than the crisis which arose in January 1893 between Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, who wanted to dismiss England’s puppet Mustapha Fehmy without British consultation, and Baring whose reaction to such an open insult was characteristic of “Over-Baring.”
He urged the British officials to deny Hussein Fehmy ministerial charges. In this mission, he was greatly helped by Rosebery’s (at the Foreign Office)

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support. An ultimatum was presented to the Khedive. If Mustapha Fehmy was not reinstated, it remained nevertheless obvious that Baring got the “last word” since Hussein Fehmy, the “Khedive protégé” was permitted to resign. This incident, however, brought a positive result for the Khedive, in the sense that although it proved that he was powerless, it nonetheless brought much support from the Egyptians themselves. Richmond, J.C.B., referring to the Khedive’s government, states: “His government was a fiction, a mere façade for the reality of British rule which could be enforced in the last resort by military action.”

His action having all but succeeded, Abbas naturally looked for support from those Nationalists who were “emerging from the trauma of their defeat, ten years before.” 35 Their moral support was met by his financial support in the form of subsidies to the newspaper “Al Muayyad”

35 Richmond, J.B.C., op.cit.
which was edited by Shaikh Ali Yusuf, and which came as a counter-reaction to the pro-British Mukattam.

Another expression of Egyptian nationalism was the riot led by a young law student Mustafa Kemal against the offices of Mukattam newspaper. Another of Abbas Hilmi’s contributions to the nationalist cause was that he financed and sent Mustafa Kemal to France so as to get support and sympathy for his cause.

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Never had an expression such as “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” been truer especially when we see that until the Fashoda incident (which destroyed France’s position) the Egyptian Nationalists kept putting confidence in the nation which was most opposed to the English occupation of Egypt, i.e. France.

But the result of Mustafa Kemal’s mission was doomed to be a failure for the Nationalists who failed to realise that whatever the rivalry between France and Britain was, the “colonialist solidarity” between these two countries was even stronger. And so, when he came back to Egypt in January, no effective results were reached.
Another serious crisis occurred in 1894 about Riaz Pasha’s resentment at having to pay the expenses of the British Army and his mortification at seeing the Egyptian Army being trained by British Officers “for British purposes. He and the Khedive attempted to strengthen the Ministry of War’s position by appointing Maher Pasha (an Egyptian) as Under Secretary.

The situation reached its higher point when, in addition, Abbas made at Wadi Halfa remarks about the Egyptian units which appeared disobliging to the Sidar who at once submitted his resignation. Having had wind of the whole affair, Cromer, with the total support of the British government, and the popular Press, decided that in this “battle of wills” he was determined to be the winner.

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Obviously, the outcome was that by the end of January, the Khedive was compelled to publish “the Order of the Day” ordering the Egyptian Army and forcing him to remove Maher Pasha from the Ministry of war. The Ministry of Interior hence forth was obliged to accept a British adviser who replaced Maher Pasha.
From then on, Nationalism took a more resolute step. Mustafa Kemal was determined to start an, organized nationalist movement when he came back to Egypt in 1896. He undertook diplomatic missions such as sending a letter to Gladstone in which he appealed for evacuation. Other appeals were made to French and British liberal opinion as well as speeches and articles. A largeumber of Arabic and newspapers made it possible for Mustafa Kemal (in the 1890’s) to make bare all the falsity of Britain’s position in Egypt as well as its contradictions.

Cromer’s acceptance of the native press, surprisingly, helped Mustafa Kemal a great deal in his mission. What was becoming obvious was, whereas in the early 1880’s the nationalist movement was very confused about its aims, it was becoming clear in the 1890’s that what was most wanted was to put an end to the British occupation.

It was also becoming clear for the Nationalists that the Khedive’s interests and theirs clashed especially as far as constitutional reforms were concerned.

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Therefore, they found themselves obliged to support the Khedive’s conservative policies while favouring Liberal support elsewhere.

This “forced limit” to the nationalist movement did not prevent Mustafa Kemal from remaining the Khedive’s ally, and it is only in 1900 that his independence from the Palace became real as he began to publish his own newspaper in which he kept pleading in favour of a parliamentary regime for Egypt.

Britain’s reaction to his nationalist sentiments and his effective criticism was alarm, for by that time, they were firmly determined to stay indeterminately in Egypt. The outcome of such a turmoil was that Britain, feeling that she did not get the gratitude that she was entitled to in all the benefits she brought about, reinforced her troops after the crisis about Fehmy’s dismissal. Consequently, a decree was issued in 1895. It allowed the establishment of special tribunals with no limits whatsoever to their powers and no appeal in the trial of offences omitted against the members of the British occupation forces.
2.4 Conclusion

Having taken such steps, Britain showed that having got deeply engaged in Egypt’s affairs, she was now really determined to stay indefinitely. This accounts for the fact that she made of Egypt a protectorate (officially) in 1914, and that it is only in 1922, when a Constitutional Monarchy was established, that she gave her independence, although only nominal. Things, however, did not change much and it is only after Gamal Abd-El-Nasser overthrew the monarchy in 1952 that Egypt not only got truly her independence but also became the first truly “Egyptian ruler in 1,000 years.”\textsuperscript{36} Despite this fact, Britain’s influence remained in one way or another, and it is only in 1956, after the Suez Canal crisis, that it diminished in a dramatic way.

\textsuperscript{36} Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Chapter three: The French and British colonial policies: Similarities and differences

3.1 Introduction

To compare two colonial Empires such as the French and the British and the policies they pursued in Algeria (in 1830 in France’s case) and in Egypt (in 1882 in Britain’s case) is interesting in many respects in the light of the similarities and the differences that existed in both cases.

3.2 French Colonial Policies

France’s falling short of making Algeria one of its integral parts and Britain’s failure in remaining permanently in Egypt is worth taking into account, considering the peculiarities that are found in the implementation of both policies. Besides, the nature of this European rule varied a great deal according to these political differences.

Before examining these differences, it is worth to briefly refer to Algeria’s and Egypt’s status and condition before their colonization (Algeria’s case) and the application of the “veiled protectorate” (Egypt’s case).
It is true that both Regencies were officially Ottoman Regencies. However, they remained semi-officially “free states.” It is important to mention that this term should not be taken too literally, for there existed an ambiguous dichotomy in their political status, in the sense that they were “free” but at the same time bound to the Ottoman Empire.

The French Minister of War shows this contradiction when he states: “With regard to the Sultan, the Dey is a sort of grand Vassal, independent to the

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point that in case of war, the Porte would not be obliged to assist (the Regency) nor would it regard itself as provoked”. This situation is undoubtedly reflected in the numerous battles Algiers’ Regency undertook without any Ottoman intervention.

It is noteworthy to mention that there was an important difference in the way power was held in Algeria and Egypt. In the first case, for instance, the Dey (a Turk) ruled through a sort of “elective Monarchy”, almost supreme, after having been elected by a military élite: the Odjack.

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38 Ibid.
In the second case, the rule was in the hands of a “dynasty” of hereditary Khedives who ruled through a Ministry nominally consisting of Egyptians.

From the financial point of view, Algeria’s situation was far more favourable than Egypt’s. The French settlement in Algeria had a dramatic effect on the growth of French colonial ambitions. Besides, the French expedition (unlike the British one) brought quick “financial results” for the French treasury and this despite its “failure to achieve political purposes.”

As a result, no less than one hundred million francs reached France from Algeria in 1830; this was obtained from the Dey’s “captured treasures and looting

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of private property.” However, only half of this sum, i.e. half a million of French francs, representing roughly the expedition expenses, reached the French Treasury. The rest had been illegally appropriated not only by officers, but by

\[40\] Ibid.
all those who took part in the invasion.

Conversely, when the British arrived in Egypt, the Egyptian Treasury lacked hard cash. This grave deficit in Egypt’s financial balance gave Britain a main reason for intervention there. Another important reason lied in the recuperation of the huge amounts of money she (and other European countries) invested in Egypt’s economy, namely in the cotton industry.

As far as the national sentiment was concerned, this colonial expansion did not correspond in France to a “national instinct.”41 as in England, and so, the French colonial policy would appear as the privilege of a group of men trying to get rid of the nation’s (France) indifference and apathy.

In this respect, Garniage, J. notes:

L’expansion ne correspondait certainement pas à un « instinct national » comme en Angleterre. L’esprit casanier du Français un atavisme « paysan » le détournait de l’aventure. Aussi la politique coloniale apparaît-elle essentiellement,

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41 Garniage, J., op.cit.
au cours du XIXème siècle, comme le privilège d’une poignée d’hommes s’efforçant de secouer l’indifférence et l’apathie de la nation.\textsuperscript{42}

Moreover, unlike Britain who had a precedent in the systematic colonization of India, i.e. after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, thanks to Lord Wellesley, Algeria was France’s first and biggest achievement. Although it did not arouse any enthusiasm on the French part at first, this achievement remained till the eighties the “testing ground” of French policies and an experimental station in every field of activity - general administration, economic policy, and native problems. \textsuperscript{43} France was “to keep the two borders of the Mediterranean if she wanted to preserve her maritime supremacy.”\textsuperscript{44} For a long period, however, uncertainty and confusion reigned in France in terms of what policies were to be applied. This was further complicated by the fact that Algeria came to occupy a rather peculiar position in the sense that it was never a colony and was never counted among the other colonies\textsuperscript{45} since it was supposed to be a prolongation of France as well as a “mixed colony”: half of settlement and

\textsuperscript{42} Garniage, J. Op cit., p.20.
\textsuperscript{44} Stern, J., Les Colonies Françaises : Passé et Avenir, Bretano’s.
\textsuperscript{45} Roberts, S.H., op.cit.
Chapter three: The French and British colonial policies: Similarities and differences

3.3 The British Colonial Policies

As far as Britain was concerned, the British authorities kept insisting on their desire to evacuate the country “as soon as the administrative and economic life permitted.” By doing so, what they wanted was to assure the stability of Egypt so as to avoid internal disturbances and the threat to Britain’s strategic route to the East, and, thus, to India.

They were aware that only the reinforcement of the traditional institutions already existing would permit such a thing. Like the colonist settlers in Algeria, the Europeans in Egypt, more specifically the bondholders were able to influence the British on numerous occasions. However, unlike the French settlers, (especially when they were in power), they did not control the British administration.

Unlike France, Britain did not have a “total” free hand in Egypt since it remained (although theoretically) an autonomous state within the

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46 Ibid.
Ottoman Empire. The Khedive continued (again theoretically) to be Egypt’s formal ruler. Another factor remained clear, i.e. as long as Britain’s presence was only temporary, no important reforms nor changes possibly made in Egypt’s international status.

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Another contradiction existed in the administrative field where Egyptian officials, despite their holding administrative positions, were subject to British control. The situation in Algeria was different, for just after the conquest, the Army of Africa (which used to deal with the colonies’ problems) had under its authority all the civilian as well as military “powers” thanks to a Royal Decree issued on July 22nd, 1834.

Moreover, there did not exist in Egypt a conflict between the military and the civilians as it did in Algeria for the simple reason that the French settlement was far more important than the British. Another characteristic worth mentioning as that the Europeans who were settled in Egypt were not brought in just after the invasion, but were already living there, whereas the French colonies came, after 1830, to constitute a very
important minority in Algeria and were far more influential than the British who were established in Egypt.

The conflict between the military and the civilians in Algeria originated in the fact that the civilians were more “sectarian” than the military, for, for them, repression was the solution to all their problems, whereas the military were gradually becoming aware of the danger represented by the civilians.

According to an Historian, the Army was fighting not for French Algeria, but rather for “colonial privileges.” While the British policy was gaining in clarity, in the sense that they were more and more aware of the problems Egypt

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was facing and were striving to find solutions to solve the latter, the French policy, on the other hand, continued in its confusion.

There was no co-ordination between Paris and Algiers. Gradually, the French started realizing that the establishment of an administration within the Algerian soil was no easy task. There was also uncertainty as to how much to extend the French influence and power. Cohen’s Rulers of Empire state that “the French policy of association was similar to that of
indirect rule advocated by Britain but was less often practiced.”

The two colonial services bore differences in their respective administrative systems. The latter were due essentially to ational and traditional values both in Egypt and in Algeria.

Nevertheless, the two powers’ attempt to establish in their colonies (or protectorate) an administrative system not too different from the already existing in the metropole, merely reflected their desire to apply a policy of assimilation or association in Algeria before 1871. All in all, the British desire for expansion was pursued out of practical considerations, i.e. political and strategic necessities whereas the French one was, to a larger extent, “actively motivated by a desire to affirm national vitality.”

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3.4 The Similarities and the Differences

To achieve this goal, an absolute administrative control was required on the French part. For this reason, the French never accepted the local

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chiefs’ authority, whereas the British “had more sympathy for the feudal lords.”

Another form of French hostility towards the natives’ values was translated in the conversion of a Mosque into a Cathedral and the destruction of two Muslim cemeteries (in order to build a road). This happened despite French’s solemn undertakings, given in 1830, to respect the Muslim religion.

The phenomenon of European rural colonization of Algeria by French settlers was by far the most dramatic. “To the European modern and commercial type of agriculture was opposed the traditional, subsistent and indigenous.”

Many farms, larger than 1,250 acres, constituted no less than 36% of the colonized land in Algeria, while more than 75% of Muslim landowners had less than 25 acres (in Algeria as well as in Morocco and Tunisia). Moreover, there

\[\text{\textsuperscript{50}}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{51}}\text{ED. Mansell, R.? A Geography of Africa.}\]
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were millions of landless labourers and share-croppers\textsuperscript{52} (Khammès) established in a very poor quality land whereas the European farmers were concentrated on a far more fertile soil. This clearly shows that in Algeria, the French settlers were “physically close enough to the core territory”\textsuperscript{53} and politically close enough to the core elites to enjoy protection from and support against the natives at whose expense the colony was established\textsuperscript{54} and who could, thanks to their large number, not only achieve but also maintain their domination quite easily.

And yet, both in Algeria and Egypt, they were comparatively “weak” if we took into account “native political mobilization to cut their ties with the Metropole”\textsuperscript{55} (from 1830 to 1871 in Algeria and 1882 and after 1892 in Egypt) where frequent armed struggles took place in the first case, and where an armed struggle (in 1882) and an intellectual one (in the decade after 1892), against both the Turks and the English took place.

Consequently, it became vital that both Britain and France should strengthen and preserve the political privileges linked with the domination

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Lustick, I., State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
over the indigenous majority. As an Historian rightly mentioned, “it was far more difficult to retain a country than to acquire it.”

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This is, no doubt, shown in the many problems both the French and the British met in trying to impose their control. Another difficulty is worth noting: the physical separation of Egypt from Britain and Algeria from France which complicated further the “projection of power from the centre to the periphery.”

A further difficult issue lies in the cultural abyss that existed between the “colonizers” and the “colonized” and which eventually led both Algeria and Egypt to a sort of “holy war” against the “infidel”, which in turn, created another form of conflict of influence which was instigated between the military and the civilians in Algeria where the military were much more interested in applying the rules prescribed by the French government.

The civilians, on the other hand, were much more interested in materialistic considerations, such as taking as much Algerian land as their

56 Ibid.
hands could lay on. Besides, they were inclined to put pressures on the French government.

Conversely, in Egypt, it was mainly the Turks (or the people of Turkish descent) who appropriated the largest lands while the British retained the power, which made the Khedive dislike the situation under which he had to rule not just with Britain’s official representative, i.e. Lord Cromer, but also with his approval.

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Another aspect of France’s and Britain’s diverging views about how to dominate the countries they have militarily subdued, is that Britain’s approach to Islamic Nationalism differed a great deal from that of France.

On that issue, Sheikh Mohammed Abduh, deservedly considered as a Muslim revolutionary, stated that the “tribulations of Egypt under Britain, compared with those of Algeria (and Tunisia under France) were as light to darkness.” The ruthless imposition of French rule and the “displacement” of the native Fellahin to make room for the French settlers gave birth to a profound animosity on the Algerians’ part and had no counterpart in Egypt during the British occupation. Conversely, the British having taken advantage of their” Indian experience” were making huge efforts to avoid exasperating the Muslims while, at the same time,
keeping a vigilant eye on the least sign of danger that would eventually come from the Nationalists.

Another difference lies in the fact that the British, unlike the French who as soon as they settled in Algeria chased the Turks and totally took power, were not prepared at all to cause any “break-up” of Turkish domination.

However, the veiled protectorate applied by Britain to Egypt was only an appearance of rule retained by the Khedive and his ministers, while the real power rested in Cromer’s hand57 aided in his task by the British army of occupation. Strangely enough, France’s position to Britain’s occupation of Egypt became more vehement in the 1890’s while she was at the same time trying to establish a firm grip upon Tunisia, and later Morocco but then, that was only an “aspect of the world-wide colonial rivalry between two

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57 Holt, P.M., ed. op. cit.
powers.”\textsuperscript{58} As J. Bergue mentioned, “in Victorian days, it was as usual to be colonized as it is nowadays to be underdeveloped.”\textsuperscript{59}

As far as armed resistance was concerned, neither France nor Britain met a strong and organized resistance. However, resistance in Algeria which started with the French attack in 1830, was continuous, Whereas after Arabi’s 1882 revolt, and for a whole decade, the Egyptians being demoralized and disorganized, as it has already been suggested, did not show any resistance.

Both the Algerian and the Egyptian armed struggle bore a similar aspect, i.e. they both were undertaken (in the beginning, before people became conscious of “nationalism”) in the name of Islam and a “Holy War” against the French and the British.

Religion was also invoked by France and Britain. Cromer’s scorn, for example, was extended to all the Egyptians who were, according to him,

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corrupted by their religion. The same sentiment was felt by the French who undertook vast operations of conversion to Christianity, thus

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
attempting to “civilize the Algerian savages.” In doing so, they thought they were saving their souls. These operations, needless to say, were in most cases, undertaken by force. It is, unfortunately, opinions like these which gave rise to hostility (against the ruling powers) of men such as Abd-El-Kader, Al-Afghani and Abduh and which created in Algeria the reinforcement not only of the religious aspect but also of the religious brotherhoods. An entire intellectual movement of revolt was created in Egypt; it ultimately expressed itself through the creation of numerous nationalist newspapers and magazines such as the Pan-Islamic magazine El Urwa Al-Withka (the indissoluble bond) in 1883 whose aim was to “free Egypt from the British occupation” by “stirring up public opinion”\textsuperscript{60} and which had a deep influence on Egyptian intellectuals in that “it kept alive the spirit of self-determination.”

Thanks to this movement, which attracted devoted members eager to continue the struggle, a gradual “break-up “of Egypt’s strict code of religious values and restrictions was brought. This proved that it was an expression of a broad-based national movement against domination.

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\textsuperscript{60} Op. cit.
In Algeria, there was as early as 1830, an “embryonic” Algerian nationalism widely spread. After France’s attack, peripherical tribes from many areas routinely refused to pay taxes. After the Turks had gone, Abd-El-Kader tried to create a “successor state.”\textsuperscript{61} This movement of resistance, however, was far from being a mere religious state. In any case, to consider the sentiment in Algeria as “merely religious and xenophobic” is to embrace a deeply rooted fallacy which has long been the standard of Eurocentric colonial historiography.\textsuperscript{62} Algerian hostility to European rule was constant and continuous. Besides, it is worth noting that the armed struggle was not the only way of resisting the French. There were passive ones which consisted, for instance, in refusing to pay heavy taxes imposed by the French authorities. In education, both the French and the British applied a more or less similar policy. In Egypt, for instance, the sums provided for education were less than half the cost of the Aswan Dam.\textsuperscript{63}

This lack of eagerness to encourage education was justified by Cromer’s successor Lord Lloyd when he claimed that “Britain had no intention of imposing her culture on indigenous culture.” It is obviously difficult to know how far this is true, but it might be possible that education was not promoted because it was not profit-earning. In Algeria,

it was proved that there was a regression in the instruction field after the French occupation.  

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3.5 Conclusion

The Muslim population gained very little from French education. The development of schools for Muslims was greatly limited by the French colonists’ opposition, because they held the view that Muslim education was “subversive.” This reluctance was met by the Muslims who refused to send their children to non-Muslim schools. (Needless to say that in this conflict, the children were the big losers). By 1892, for example, the proportion of Muslims in schools was 1.73 as opposed to 20% under the Turks. By 1868, twenty years after Algeria was declared an integral part of France, there were 35 so-called Franco-Arabic primary schools for a Muslim population of about 3 million. This was hardly enough when compared to the huge amount of money: 1,099,975 US dollars devoted to education in 1979 in Algeria.  

64 Julien, C.H., op.cit.

65 Heggoy, A.A., op.cit.
General Conclusion

Both North-West and North-East Africa have occupied an unprecedented place in the history of European Colonial Empires (especially the British and the French) namely because their proximity to the European continent made them a consequent part of its environment and, so, any alteration on the condition of one or another of these North-African countries would hence cause the interest of several European states.

Besides, it is interesting to note that the entire North- Africa (except Morocco’s Sultanate) were provinces of the Ottoman Empire. What encouraged both Britain and France in their colonizing enterprise was that, first, neither Algeria nor Egypt had a definite political status permitting them to deal with problems efficiently. Secondly, the
Ottoman Empire was no longer, in the 19th century, as strong as it used to be in the 17th and the 18th centuries to either protect or adequately control the countries which were under its rule before France and Britain took over.

Nevertheless, this ambiguity did not prevent Egypt from partly achieving informal independence before 1847, nor did it prevent Algeria from following Egypt’s steps by seeking a more or less effective independence.

General Conclusion

Despite this situation of so-called “freedom”, none of these two countries (Algeria and Egypt) were diplomatically or politically recognized as sovereign entities. One of the striking similarities between Turkish, British and French imperialism was that the three forces (which were mainly military) were mostly interested in the maintenance of order and the collection of heavy taxes imposed by the occupation forces on the indigenous. As far as the settlers were concerned, especially in France’s case, colonizing a country meant, in the first palace, “getting food from it: plentiful for some, sparsely for others. For a few, this meant rich and

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delectable foodstuffs, but most were content if they could get their daily bread.\textsuperscript{67} This situation was true in both Algeria and Egypt, where the Fellahin were struggling, often in inhuman conditions in order to improve their miserable lot, whereas the Europeans, in the case of Algeria, were taking full advantage of the immense lands they acquired.

With the British, the situation was, however, slightly different, for they were less interested in land taking. In fact, what they were mostly interested in was as much profit-making as possible, especially from the industries they implemented in Egypt.

General Conclusion

What made things so difficult for the French in Algeria and the British in Egypt was the singular situation in which they found themselves in presence of a distinct community. This singularity derives from the presence of two totally different communities: one Muslim and the other European, “rooted in the soil of the same country (i.e. Algeria and Egypt)\textsuperscript{68} obliging two civilizations to deal with each other\textsuperscript{69} and never succeeding entirely because of the too many divergences that existed between them. Despite this explosive situation, Britain and France


\textsuperscript{69} Deux civilisations apprennent à se juxtaposer au prix de quelques coups de reins. Les institutions se mettent en place, se déterminant, en fonction d'une époque et d'un environnement. (Baylé, J. :Quand l'Algérie devenait Française).
remained secure as long as there was no serious challenge to their authority. However, since they were both willing to expand, they had to have a policy adequate to their means and obligations.

This policy was, however, never clear enough as to determine its objectives or even create a “colonial doctrine” capable of counter-balancing rebellion. One can say that it is precisely this lack of clarity in their objectives, together with the application of measures which if adequate in the Métropole (i.e. the suppression of the natives’ rules and their replacement by European ones, etc…) were not appropriate in a different milieu and society.

It is this failure in understanding Egypt’s and Algeria’s specific features that prevented both France and Britain from being entirely successful in their occupations of both countries.

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NOTES
TRAITE DESMICHELS

Le général Desmichels avait obtenu de son gouvernement, l'autorisation de traiter avec l'émir Abdelkader sur les bases suivantes :

1) Reconnaissance de la souveraineté de la France par Abdelkader, qui prêterait foi et hommage au roi des Français ; paiement d'un tribut annuel ;

2) Reconnaissance par la France d'Abdelkader comme Bey d'un certain nombre de tribus ; investiture donnée par le roi ;

3) Importation et exportation par le port d'Oran de tous les objets nécessaires aux Arabes ou vendus par les Arabes ;

4) Engagement pris par l'Emir de n'acheter que chez les Français les armes et les munitions de guerre ;

5) Envoi d'agents français auprès d'Abdelkader, afin de servir d'intermédiaires entre les commandants de la province et lui-même déclaré Bey.

"Pendant ce temps, l'Emir avait envoyé à Oran deux de ses Khalifas Miloud ben Harrach et Ould Mahmoud, lesquels s'abouchant le 4 Février 1834 en dehors de la ville avec Mardochée Amar, reçurent de lui les instructions du général, qu'ils rapportèrent à Abdelkader, reproduites dans une note ne portant pas de signature." (Henri Garro - Histoire générale de l'Algérie).

Cette note était ainsi conçu :

1) À compter d'aujourd'hui, les hostilités cesseront entre les Arabes et les Français ;

2) La religion et les usages des musulmans seront respectés ;

3) Les prisonniers français seront rendus ;
4) Les marchés seront libres ;
5) Tout déserteur français sera rendu par les Arabes ;
6) Tout chrétien qui voudra voyager par terre devra être muni d'une permission revêtue du cachet du Consul d'Abdellkader et de celui du Général.

Cette note parvenue à Abdellkader, fut retournée le 23 Février, revêtue de son cachet ; mais Ben Miloud avait reçu l'ordre de ne la livrer qu'après que le général Desmichels aurait approuvé une note parallèle indiquant les conditions mises par l'émir à la paix. Cette deuxième note était ainsi conçue :

1) Les Arabes auront la liberté de vendre et d'acheter de la poudre, des armes, du soufre, enfin, tout ce qui concerne la guerre ;
2) Le commerce de la Mesa (Arzew) sera sous le gouvernement du prince des croyants, comme par le passé, et pour toutes les affaires. Les cargaisons ne se feront pas autre part que dans ce port. Quant à Mostaganem et à Oran, ils ne recevront que les marchandises nécessaires aux besoins de leurs habitants, et personne ne pourra s'y opposer. Ceux qui désireront charger des marchandises devront se rendre à Arzew ;
3) Le général nous rendra tous les déserteurs et les fera exécuter. Il ne recevra pas non plus les criminels. Le général commandant à Alger n'aurait pas le pouvoir sur les musulmans qui viendraient auprès de lui avec le consentement de leurs chefs ;
4) On ne pourra empêcher un musulman de retourner chez lui quand il le voudra.

Le général Desmichels, auquel les traducteurs avaient attiré la portée de l'article 2 de cette note, y apposa son cachet, après quoi Miloud ben Harrach lui fit remise de sa première note, dont il était porteur, approuvée par Abdellkader.

Le général français considérant ces deux notes comme de simples préliminaires, demanda à l'envoyé de l'émir une rédaction définitive du traité.

Miloud ben Harrach qui avait entre les mains, approuvée par le général, la note contenant les conditions d'Abdellkader, ne fit aucune difficulté et le lendemain de son retour à Oran, le traité réclamé par le général était rédigé en six articles sur deux colonnes, dont l'une contenait le texte français, l'autre le texte arabe (Henri Garros).

En voici la teneur :

Le général commandant les troupes françaises dans la ville d'Oran et le prince des fidèles Si El Hadj Abdellkader ben Mahieddine, ont arrêté les conditions suivantes :

Article Premier. — A partir de ce jour, les hostilités entre les Français et les Arabes cessent. Le général commandant les troupes françaises et l'émir Abdellkader ne négligeront rien pour faire régner l'union et l'amitié qui devraient exister entre les deux peuples que Dieu a destiné à vivre sous la même domination. A cet effet, des représentants de l'émir résideront à Oran, Mostaganem, et Arzew, de même que pour prévenir toutes collisions entre les Français et les Arabes, des officiers français résideront à Mascara.

Art. 2. — La religion et les usages des Arabes seront respectés et protégés.

Art. 3. — Les prisonniers seront immédiatement rendus de part et d'autre.

Art. 4. — La liberté du commerce sera pleine et entière.

Art. 5. — Les Militaires de l'armée française qui abandonneraient leurs drapeaux seront ramenés par les Arabes. De même, les malfrateurs qui pour se soustraire à un châtiment mérité, fuiraient leurs tribus et viendraient chercher un refuge auprès des Français, seront immédiatement remis aux représentants de l'émir aux trois villes maritimes occupées par les Français.

Art. 6. — Tout Européen qui serait dans le cas de voyager dans l'intérieur, sera muni d'un passeport visé par les représentants de l'émir et approuvé par le général commandant, afin qu'il puisse trouver dans toute la province aide et protection.

Fait en double expéditions à ORAN, le 26 février 1834.

Le Commandant Général

BARON DESMICHES
Cette convention fut ratifiée le lendemain par l'Emir, qui apposa son cachet au dessous du texte arabic.

Le Gouvernement français ne connaissait que cet acte, alors que l'Emir se prévalait toujours de la seconde note parallèle sur laquelle le général avait apposé son cachet.

Le général Desmichels, qui avait négligé de tenir le ministère au courant des notes et ne lui avait pas soumis le document portant la date du 26 Février, reçut l'autorisation de faire connaître par écrit à l'Emir que le Roi avait approuvé le traité ; mais l'interprète Marochée Amar, chargé de préparer la lettre, se servit dans sa traduction du mot « chérif » pour le mot « chérif », qui signifie « conséquent » « articles de traité ». De telles erreurs qu'Abdélkader pus se prévaloir que le Roi avait approuvé les trois documents, et par conséquent « les traités » alors que dans l'esprit du général il n'en existait qu'un seul.

Cette notification faite, le général Desmichels envoya comme consul de France à Mascara, le commandant Abdellah d'Arbouin, ancien musulman de l'armée d'Egypte, et l'émir se fit représenter à Oran par son parent Habib el-Hady et à Arzew, par Oudal Malhoun. (Henri Garrot op. cit.)

TRAITE DE LA TAFNA

Le général Bugaud se trouvait en mars 1837 à Oran. Le cabinet français lui avait recommandé de ne recevoir aux armes que s'il ne parvenait pas à conclure un traité avec l'Emir où la France fut reconnue souveraine. Il remit donc à l'agent de l'Emir, Ben Duran une note résumant le désir du cabinet en ces points :

1) Reconnaissance de la souveraineté de la France par Abdellaher ;
2) Limitation du pouvoir de l'Emir au Chérif ;
3) Paiement d'un tribut annuel ;
4) Remise d'otages, avec garantie de l'exécution du traité.

Natu.rellement l'Emir Abdellaher refuse de traiter sur ces bases et sans perdre de temps se porte dans la vallée du Chérif, visite Miliana, Cherchell et Médès, arrête quelques partisans des Français parmi les Kouloughis et souleve les tribus pour empêcher la jonction des troupes françaises d'Alger avec celles d'Oran. Son dispositif de sécurité installé, il retourne dans la Province d'Oran, sans avoir reçu la commission de Bleda.

Le 12 Mai, l'Emir répondait aux propositions de Paix du Général Bugaud, par un projet de traité dont la traduction était ainsi donnée :

Art. 1er. — L'Emir reconnaît la souveraineté de la France ;
Art. 2. — Tous les Ismaïlyns qui habitent hors des villes seront sous sa loi.
Art. 3. — Le territoire d'Oran sera de Bréda à la mer, et de Bréda jusqu'au marais de la Macta, et du côté d'Alger, jusqu'à l'Oued Beni-Assa.
Art. 4. — Il donnera, cette année seulement, 20,000 mètres de fourrè, 20,000 mètres d'orge et 3,000 boeufs.
Art. 5. — L'Emir achèvera en France la poudre, le souchère, les armes.
Art. 6. — Les Kouloughis qui voudront rester à Tlemcen posséderont leurs propriétés et seront traités comme les citadins.
Art. 7. — Ceux qui s'en iront du territoire français ou du territoire de l'Emir, seront réciproquement rendus sur la requête de l'une ou de l'autre partie.
Art. 8. — La France cède à l'Emir, Rachgouni, Tlemcen, le Médchouch, les marais et les canons qui y étaient anciennement.

L'Emir s'obligera à faire transporter à Oran tous les effets de la garnison.
Art. 9. — Le commerce sera libre entre les Arabes et les Français.
Art. 10. — Les Français seront respectés chez les Arabes comme les Arabes chez les Français.

Art. 11. — Les fermes et les propriétés que les Français auront acquises dans la Mitidja leur seront garantis. Ils en jouiront librement.

Or, comme pour le traité Dermignets, cette traduction se trouvait infidèle. L'article premier disait strictement dans la minute arabe : « Le prince des fidèles sait que le Sultan est grand », sans dire si ce sultan était l’Empereur du Maroc ou le roi des Français.

Art. 2. — Le pouvoir sur les Musulmans qui sont hors des villes d’Alger et d’Oran, et quelque part qu’ils habitent, sera entre les mains de l’Émir.

C’était l’abandon des villes d’Arzew, de Mostaganem, de Mascara.

Art. 3. — Les Français possèderont du côté de l’Ouest d’Oran, depuis Breda et Sdir, en y comprénant la Sebkha et le littoral de la mer jusqu’à la Macta. Du côté d’Alger, ils auront du côté de la rivière des Benni Azea, jusqu’à Alger, ce qui cédait Bédja à l’Émir.

Art. 4. — Les mots : « Cette année seulement » ne se trouvent pas dans le texte arabe.

Art. 5. — Le texte dit : « L’Émir achètera la poudre, le soufre, les armes », sans dire où.

Art. 6. — Ceux des Koudjahits qui voudront partir avec les Français, personne ne s’y opposera ; ceux qui voudront rester, seront sous notre puissance et sous celle de nos lois.

Quoi qu’il en soit de cette traduction de Bou-Duran, le général Bugeaud l’envoya à Paris, et se décida à recourir aux armes pour affaiblir son ennemi dans l’ouest, et délibérer de toute inquiétude de ce côté la nouvelle expédition qui allait être entreprise contre le bey de Constantine.

Le général Bugeaud ne remporte aucune victoire sur l’Émir. Mais ce dernier, sentant la nécessité d’une paix, pour parachever l’organisation de son état, lui dépêcha un émissaire porteur d’un projet de rectification des préliminaires du traité, établissant les points suivants :

1) « Abandon de Bédja aux Français » ;
2) Renonciation à tout pouvoir de l’Émir sur les Musulmans qui habiteraient le territoire réservé à la France ;
3) Extension des limites de ce territoire dans une certaine mesure.

Le général qui se voyait dans une impasse, trouvant alors les conditions relativement avantageuses, en raison des circonstances dans lesquelles elles se produisaient, envoiait le 26 mai à Abdelkader les termes d’un nouveau projet, que l’Émir, d’autre part, pressé d’en terminer pour s’approvisionner, accepta sans réserves. (Hauri Garrot, ouv. cit.).

Voici le texte français de cette convention, qui porte le nom de traité de la Tafna :

Entre le lieutenant général Bugeaud, commandant les troupes françaises dans la province d’Oran, et l’Émir Abdelkader, a été convenu le traité suivant :

Article Premier. — L’Émir Abdelkader reconnaît la souveraineté de la France sur une partie de la régence.

Art. 2. — La France se réserve :
Dans la province d’Oran :
Mostaganem, Mazagran et leurs territoires : Oran : Arzew, plus un territoire ainsi délimité : à l’Est, par la rivière la Macta et le marais d’où elle sort ; au Sud, par une ligne partant du marais c’dessus mentionné, passant par le bord sud du lac Sebkha et se prolongeant jusqu’à l’Oued Malah (Rio Salado), dans la direction de Sidi Said et de cette rivière jusqu’à la mer, de manière à ce que tout le territoire compris dans ce périmètre soit français.

Dans la province d’Alger :
Alger, le Sahel, la plaine de la Mitidja, bordee à l’Est jusqu’à l’Oued Kaddara et au-delà ; au Sud, par la crête de la première chaîne du Petit Atlas jusqu’à la Chiffa, en comprenant Bîda et son territoire ; à l’Ouest par la Chiffa, jusqu’auconduit du Massafra, et, de là par une ligne droite jusqu’à la mer, renfermant Koléa et son territoire, de ma-
Art. 3. — L’Emir administrera (le texte arabe dit gouvernera) la province d’Oran, celle de Tlemcen, et la partie de celle d’Alger qui n’est pas comprise, à l’Est, dans la limite indiquée par l’article 2 ; il ne pourra pénétrer dans aucune autre partie de la régence.

Art. 4. — L’Emir n’aura aucune autorité sur les musulmans qui voudraient habiter le territoire réservé à la France; mais ceux-ci resteront libres d’aller vivre sur le territoire dont l’Emir aura l’administration, comme les habitants du territoire de l’Emir pourront s’établir sur le territoire français.

Art. 5. — Les Arabes vivant sur le territoire français exerceront librement leur religion. Ils pourront y bâtir des mosquées et suivre en tout point leur discipline religieuse sous l’autorité de leurs chefs spirituels.

Art. 6. — L’Emir donnera à l’armée française : 30.000 fanègues d’Oran de froment ; 30.000 fanègues d’Oran d’orge ; 5.000 bœufs.

Art. 7. — L’Emir achètera en France la poudre, le souffre, et les armes dont il aura besoin.

Art. 8. — Les Kouloughlis qui voudront rester à Tlemcen ou ailleurs, y possèderont librement leurs propriétés et y seront traités comme hadaris (citadins). Ceux qui voudront se retirer sur le territoire français pourront vendre et affermir librement leurs propriétés.

Art. 9. — La France cède à l’Emir : Rachgoun, Tlemcen, le Méchouar et les canons qui étaient anciennement dans cette citadelle.

L’Emir s’obligera à faire transporter à Oran tous les effets, ainsi que les munitions de guerre et de bouche de la garnison de Tlemcen.

Art. 10. — Le commerce sera libre entre les Arabes et les Français, qui pourront s’établir sur l’un ou l’autre territoire.

Art. 11. — Les Français seront respectés chez les Arabes, comme les Arabes chez les Français. Les fermes et les propriétés que les français ont acquises ou acqueront sur le territoire arabe leur seront garanties ; ils en jouiront librement, et l’Emir s’oblige à leur rembourser les dommages que les Arabes leur feraient éprouver.


Art. 13. — L’Emir s’engage à ne concéder aucun point du littoral à une puissance quelconque, sans un accord avec la France.

Art. 14. — Le commerce de la régence ne pourra se faire que dans les ports occupés par la France.

Art. 15. — La France pourra entretenir des agents auprès de l’Emir et dans les villes soumises à son administration, pour servir d’intermédiaires auprès de lui, aux sujets français, pour les contestations commerciales ou autres qu’ils pourraient avoir avec les Arabes.

L’Emir jouera de la même faculté dans les villes et ports français.

Cachet de l’Emir

Le Lieutenant Général

sous le texte arabe

Commandant à Oran

BUGEAUD.
Abstract

This dissertation tries to examine the policies of two colonial empires: The French colonial empire in Algeria (1830) and the British colonial one in Egypt (1882). It mainly attempts to analyze the similarities and the differences in terms of the colonial policies implemented. France’s falling short of making Algeria one of its integral parts and Britain’s failure in remaining permanently in Egypt will be focused. This dissertation will also attempt to show the peculiarities that existed in the implementation of their policies. Both Regencies (Algeria and Egypt) were officially Ottoman Regencies which remained semi-officially “free states”. There was a difference in the way power was held in Algeria and Egypt. For the former, the Dey (a Turk) ruled through a so-called “elective Monarchy” after having been elected by a military élite: “the Odjak”. For the latter, the rule was in the hands of a “Dynasty” of hereditary “Khedives” who ruled through a Ministry consisting of Egyptians. Unlike Britain which had a precedent in the systematic colonization of India, after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-1858, Algeria was France’s first and biggest achievement, though it did not arouse any enthusiasm on the French part, and remained till the eighties the testing ground of de French policies.

KEY WORDS:

Algeria; Egypt; Empire; Colonisation; Rebellion of 1857-1858; Convergences; Divergences; Ottoman; France; Great Britain.